The Republic of Bulgaria and NATO - Partnership and Integration by Nikolova, Nina Nikolova
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2000-06
The Republic of Bulgaria and NATO - Partnership
and Integration
Nikolova, Nina Nikolova
Monterey, California:  Naval Postgraduate School.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/37411
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 
THESIS 









Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
~C QUliLITY UJi:PEC1I1£D 1 
20000721 041 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved 
OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaini~g the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments 
regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters 
Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to 
the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
June 2000 Master's Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA AND NATO - PARTNERSHIP AND INTEGRATION 
6. AUTHOR(S) 
Nikolova, Nina N. 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER 
2 University CIR-SGC 1930 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
9. SPONSORING I MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING I MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
lfhe views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense 
or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION I AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
The transformations of the political relations in Europe at the dawn of 21st century resulted in deep changes in the concepts of 
security and redefining the existing systems for collective defense in Europe. NATO becoming the security and defense framework of 
Europe had to deeply reconsider its raison d'etre and to enlarge. 
In this connection the Republic of Bulgaria deeply reconsidered its political and strategic position in this new environment, started 
profound reforms in its security institutions and continues to consolidate the democratic statecraft. This Thesis analyzes the process of 
NATO enlargement and advocates the possibilities of membership for Bulgaria at the next 2002 NA TO Summit. Bulgaria needs a quick 
entrance, not only for its strategic geopolitical position in Southeastern Europe, but for its efforts to participate in the building of united 
Europe and to support the Allian~e as a reliable partner, committed to contribute and to preserve the peace and stability in the region 
and Europe and to promote democratic values. The membership will strengthen the process of European integration and create a better 
climate for economic growth and prosperity in Europe. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS 
Bulgaria, Security, NATO, Enlargement, Strategic threat, Foreign policy, 
Civil-Military Relations, Civilian Control, President, Ministry of Defense, 
Military reform, The US, Russia, Kosovo. 




15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
101 
16. PRICE CODE 





Standard Form 298 (Rev.2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
11 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA AND NATO - PARTNERSHIP AND 
INTEGRATION 
Nina Nikolova Nikolova 
Ministry of Defense, Republic of Bulgaria 
MA in Law., University of Sofia "St. Climent Ohridsky", 1988 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degrees of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
AND 




NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
June2000 
Nma N. Ntkolova 
Frank Petho, Chairman 




The transformations of the political relations in Europe at the dawn of 21st century 
resulted in deep changes in the concepts of security and redefining the existing systems 
for collective defense in Europe. NATO becoming the security and defense framework of 
Europe had to deeply reconsider its raison d'etre and to enlarge. 
In this connection the Republic of Bulgaria deeply reconsidered its political and 
strategic position in this new environment, started profound reforms in its security 
institutions and continues to consolidate the democratic statecraft. This Thesis analyzes 
the process of NATO enlargement and advocates the possibilities of membership for 
Bulgaria at the next 2002 NATO Summit. Bulgaria needs a quick entrance, not only for 
its strategic geopolitical position in Southeastern Europe, but for its efforts to participate 
in the building of the united Europe and to support the Alliance as a reliable partner, 
committed to contribute and to preserve the peace and stability in the region and Europe 
and to promote democratic values. The membership will strengthen the process of 
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I. INTRODUCTION - THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND THE 
POSITION OF BULGARIA IN THE NEW EUROPE 
At the very beginning of the 21 51 century Europe's political and economic order is 
by no means settled. It is rapidly shifting. Europe changes in a new political environment. 
The Cold War is over, the major threats and fears of global war's cataclysms are gone, 
bringing deep and dramatic changes into the bipolar model of international relationships 
between the super powers and rearranging the security relations and the existing status 
quo. 
The traditional East - West confrontation and the dividing line in the core of 
Europe disappeared and more or less was put an end to the dual nuclear deterrence. Along 
with that the European security institutions underwent significant changes, the Warsaw 
Pact was dissolved but NATO unquestionably remained the security and defense 
framework of Western Europel. 
Regretfully since 1989 new security risks or boiling pots of conflicts on the 
political stage of South Eastern Europe revealed their complexity. Europe started to search 
and remake its identity, different from the "vulgar"2 map of Huntington in his book "The 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order"3, which divided Europe into 
1 Brenner, Michael, NATO and Collective Security, p. 249, St Martin's Press, Inc., New York, N.Y., 1998. 
2 Ash, Timothy Garton, "The Puzzle of Central Europe", The New York Review, pp .. 18-23, March 18, 
1999. 
3 See Appendix A. Huntington's dividing line in the map as adapted from Huntington, Samuel P ., The Clash 
of Civilization and the Remaking of the World Order, p. 159, Simon and Shuster, 1996. 
1 
civilized and uncivilized parts based upon rather unacceptable if intelligible at all 
religious and cultural criteria. 
The states brought to the scene their problems, social tensions, economic crises 
and political instabilities that were ignored or somehow suppressed in the previous 
political framework. Now there are more than ever internal conflicts, the resolving of 
which engages the efforts of the states committed to preserve the global peace. 
The Republic of Bulgaria is among the states that had deeply to reconsider its 
political and strategic position in this new environment in order to contribute and to 
preserve the peace and stability in the region and Europe4. This process forms the focus of 
the analysis of this thesis. 
The recent events in South Eastern Europe, climaxing in Kosovo in 1998-99 
unleashed many questions and provoked the need to reshape the security architecture of 
the region and Europe, which surely has global influence because of the world powers' 
involvement in this theater. However, these issues need just and viable security 
solutions. This means integrating the countries of South Eastern Europe into the Euro-
Atlantic system. This Thesis argues that Bulgaria and other states of the region must be 
brought into NATO and the European Union remodeled to the requirements of the 
present era. 
This thesis analyzes the 1991-2000 process of NATO enlargement and advocates 
the possibilities of membership for Bulgaria. 
4 See Pond, Elizabeth, "Bulgaria", Europe, pp .. 26-27, June 1999. 
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The immediate questions are: 
What are the ways to ensure the security of the country from external threats at 
this stage?; 
What are the challenges the Bulgarian security and military reform face?; 
How crucial to Bulgaria are the goals for membership in NATO? 
This thesis suggests that, despite the recent trials of the North Atlantic Alliance in 
the second half of the 1990s, the accession of Bulgaria to NATO remains a vital interest 
to all concerned with peace and security in South eastern Europe. Plainly the events of 
1999-the Article 10 accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as well as the 
Kosovo operation-demonstrate that NATO is in the midst of great change, much of this 
process is of a critical and dangerous nature. The NATO operation of March-June 1999 
reminds all concerned of the familiar challenges of waging war in a coalition of 
democracies. However, these problems cannot obscure another truth that is equally as 
vital: the exclusion from the west of those partner countries with a vital interest in 
institutional association can yet lay the seed of renewed conflict in Southeastern Europe. 
Bulgaria, is entitled to such individual approach, not only for its strategic 
geopolitical position in Southeastern Europe, but for its efforts to support the Alliance as a 
reliable partner and to promote democratic values in the region. The membership will 
strengthen the process of European integration and create a better climate for economic 
growth and prosperity. With Bulgaria as a partner NATO and also the EU under the 
auspices of the ESDI (common foreign and security policy agenda) will form a strong 
Southeastern strategic flank. 
3 
The variables that affect the process of accession of Bulgaria in NATO include: 
historical factors; political culture and political institutions; democratic state and society 
structures; socioeconomic development; the military reform; the security policy; and 
international factors. The thesis will assess the impact of only three essential variables: 1) 
the strength of the democratic reforms in the security and military institution; 2) the 
military aspects of the security policy - the impact of the war in Kosovo (1998-1999) and 
3) the Bulgarian security relationships with NATO. The three variables correspond with 
the criteria for accession in accordance of the "Study on NATO Enlargement" 19955 and 
Membership Action Plan 19996. The focus here is on Bulgaria's possibilities for 
membership- how this goal can be achieved quickly. 
The dependent variable is the process of enlargement of NATO as cooperative 
security institution with core function of collective defense. The independent variables are 
the three factors, which are considered as most important for the case cited above. The 
thesis will apply them in an effort to assess the perspective of the country to achieve its 
security goals. 
The transformations of the political environment after the failure of the model of 
"real socialism", and the end of the Cold War resulted in profound changes in the 
concepts of security and redefining the existing systems for collective defense. NATO as a 
collective defense institution had to a) reconsider its traditional strategic operational 
5 NATO, Study on NATO Enlargement, 1995. Available (Online):[htpp://www.otan.nato.int]. 15 February 
2000. 
6 NATO, Membership Action Plan, Press Communique NAC-S(99)66, Washington Summit, April 1999. 
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raison d'etre and to adopt new missions, b) to open its doors for new members and c) to 
spread the security umbrella over them. The policy of enlargement created a deep division 
among scholars and policymakers7. The opponents of the policy, representative of 
different schools, realist or institutionalists, considered the idea for new members in the 
words of John Lewis Gaddis as "ill-conceived, ill-timed and ill-suited to the realities"8. 
Henry Kissinger concluded that the price of NATO enlargement was its gross dilution9. 
They are wrong however. 
The reappearance of instability and tension in South Eastern Europe from 1991 on, 
revived for the politicians and the public the negative geopolitical term "the Balkans" with 
connotation of being drenched in blood lo. 
This crisis turned to be now the major threat for the security in Europe and the 
closest external threat for the neighboring countries. In terms of geography the Republic 
of Bulgaria is located very close to this area of crisis and has deep historical links, which 
make it a direct participant in the events. The country as all the former East European 
states wants to find a decent place as a stable democracy within the European tradition 
and culture. In this particular aspect Bulgaria considers membership in NATO as the only 
possible form of collective security and defense. The institution of NATO is supposed to 
7 Croft, Stuart, Redmond, John, Wyn Rees, G., Webber, Mark, The Enlargement of Europe, pp .. 22-48, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, NY, 1999. 
8 Kay, Sean, NATO and the Future of European Security, p. 103, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
Maryland, 1998. 
9 Ibid., p. 103. 
10 Ash, Timothy Garton, "The Puzzle of Central Europe," The New York Review, p. 20, 18 March 1999. 
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provide reassurance against a revival of a hegemonic power in Europe, to support the 
peace and to stabilize and pacify the relations of the European countries. I I 
In 1997 the Bulgarian government stated the nation's desire to become a member 
of the Atlantic Alliance and its readiness to be invited to start the accession negotiations. 
A significant portion of the public12, who share the values, principles and objectives that 
the Alliance represents, supports this policy. 
The only way to achieve the strategic foreign policy goals is to follow this 
immutable course. The Balkans have always been considered a region bearing a penchant 
for "producing more history than it can consume", as Churchill once saidl3. For the last 
century the region has been in the center of two world wars and numerous regional 
conflicts and the spread of nationalism has release dangerous forces of destructionI4. 
Bulgaria, trying to forget the historical iniquities for being sometimes a victim of the 
Great Powers' plotsI5, plays an important role as a stabilizing factor in the region and did 
so again in the Kosovo conflict in 1999. 
11 Brenner, Michael, NATO and Collective Security, p. 249, St. Martin's Press, Inc., New York, N.Y., 
I998. 
12 See the polls cited in Chapter IV of this Thesis, p. 60. 
l3 As cited by Unger, Brooke, Survey: "The Balkans: Europe's Roughest Neighbourhood," The Economist, 
1999. Available (Online): [http://www.economist.com/ editorial/justforyou/library/index _surveys.html]. I 5 
January 2000. 
14 Giplin, Robert, War and Change in World Politics, p. 225, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
UK, I981. 
15 Craig, Gordon and George, Alexander, Force and Statecraft, p. 35, Oxford University Press, Inc., New 
York, I995. 
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In order to be such a factor the Bulgarian policy has to rise above the historical 
heritage of ethnic and religious clashes and to orient the foreign relations with the 
neighboring states towards peaceful cooperation and stability. 
Firmly desiring to promote the democratic values, in 1998-1999 Bulgaria took the 
risk to oppose openly the events in neighboring Yugoslavia. Being a reliable partner, 
Bulgaria fully supported the international efforts of NATO countries by contributing to 
them while participating in IFOR and SFOR and later in KFOR, thereby supporting 
NATO's operation in Kosovo. At the same time, Bulgaria is among the states suffering the 
greatest political, economic, and psychological losses as a real "hostage" to the conflictl6 
as discussed in details in Chapter IV of this Thesis. In spite of that the Government 
supported the NATO airstrikes, challenging the regime of Milosevic and also the Russian 
foreign policy for the region of Pan-slavism and 19th century pattern of obsolete Great 
Power politics. 
An essential aspect of the Bulgarian strategy for NATO's admission is to 
demonstrate commitment to being a responsible partner and dependable future ally able to 
undertake the obligations of membership. In particular Bulgaria has made a great 
improvement in the reform of the security institutions and military reform, which for eight 
years was trying to find its way out of the legacy of the 20th century totalitarianism and 
!6 Reuters, Kostov, Ivan, "Kosovo - Biggest Problem for Bulgaria," Capital, 1999. Available (Online):' 
[htpp://www.capital.bg/]. 15 January 2000. 
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war, weak civil-military control and a ruined economy I 7. Bulgaria started its NATO-
relationship by joining the North Atlantic Cooperation Council - NACC (now Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council - EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace program (PfP). It 
continues to be an active PfP member and efficiently participates in the initiative, but its 
final goal is full membership in NATO. This objective is hard to be accomplished in a 
period of economic crisis, which Bulgaria is undergoing now but the recent three years of 
democratic rule show the stable process of their achievement. Its efforts are to establish a 
stable democracy and to achieve interoperability with NATO as soon as possible. The 
countries, which have made the most substantial progress in democratic and economic 
reforms as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, were the first to be invited to join 
NATO in 1997. Bulgaria was deemed not ready to fulfil the requirements and facing 
difficulties, but actively supported with its foreign policy the efforts of NATO and the EU 
to stabilize the region, being itself a stabilizing factor. In its full membership in the 
European Union and NATO Bulgaria sees its future not only as a civilized choice but also 
as a matter of survival. Bulgaria needs their assistance while in the process of transition to 
democracy as it is stated in Art. 2 of the Washington Treaty18. Only within the community 
of the democratic European states Bulgaria can fully recover and build its prosperity. Such 
examples already exist with the democratic transitions and stabilization in Portugal, 
17 Simon, Jeffrey, "Bulgaria and NATO: 7 Lost Years," Strategic Forum, Number 142, National Defense 
University, May 1998. 
18 Art.2, The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D.C., 1949. 
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Greece, Turkey and Spainl9, achieved in part as members of NATO. The uncertainty and 
eventual delay in the time schedule of accession might lead to a defect in the ongoing 
institution building process and to the frustration in the beliefs of the people, which is 
critical for the legitimacy of democracy. The feeling of disappointment can shake the 
stability of the political civic arena as the latest election in 1999 in Bulgaria showed and 
induced to the changes in the cabinet and even of the minister of defense. 
While the Kosovo operation of March-June 1999 may be too fresh in the 
collective mind to allow a full scholarly analysis, this thesis per force must attempt a 
tentative appraisal of these contemporary events as concerns the character and evolution 
of Bulgarian foreign, security, and defense policies in this era of rapid change in 
Southeastern Europe. Although these events cannot provide this thesis with the necessary 
criteria for academic explanation they are used in this study as a background information 
concerning the current constraints upon the Bulgarian foreign and defense policy. 
Bulgaria being a "front-line state" made its commitments to Euro-Atlantic policy. 
The Bulgarian foreign policy sees real guarantees for security and stability only in 
an alliance with,NATQ20. Its past choices as a member of the former Warsaw Pact 
already judged by history can be seen as an illumination of this· decision. The study will 
revise the achievements and weakness in the way of fulfilling this goal. The events in the 
19 Aguero, Felipe, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, p. 205, The John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore and London, 1995. 
20 Program of the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria 1997-2001. Available (Online): [http://www. 
bulgaria. govm. bg/ eng/ oficial _docs/index.html]. I 0 February 2000. 
9 
Balkan region prove the significance of the collective measures and the importance of the 
Alliance as the sole peace-making factor. The recent future membership of Bulgaria in the 
organization is aimed to strengthen the stability in the region and in the world21. 
Bulgaria's active pursuit of regional cooperation and its tireless efforts to muster the 
regional democratic security policy already gave results in the EU's decision to invite 
Bulgaria for accession talks, convinced of the Bulgarian European vocation. The next 
logical step is the Bulgarian membership in NATO. 
The following chapters of this Thesis discuss the topics in detail: 
Chapter II - NATO Enlargement - The New Challenges - examines the process of 
accepting new members and the challenges, which the Alliance face. The new political 
environment changed the strategy and the concept of the organization22. The process of 
enlargement faced NATO with new dilemmas: to avoid the creation of new dividing lines 
in Europe it will have to find a way to spread the security umbrella over each country or 
to accept them all as members. On the other hand this process and approach can foster 
regional tensions if a country is not accepted or if it is accepted. The alienation of 
relations with Russia, which still is a world player and still is sensitive about the 
accession of the former Warsaw Pact states in "the club", imposes additional tension. The 
2! See Pond, Elizabeth, "Come Together", Foreign Affairs, pp .. 8-12, vol. 79, Number 2, March/April 
2000. 
22 For more information about former NATO strategy based on the assumption of the total war, used in 
1949-1989, see Duffield, John S., Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO Conventional Force Posture, p. 
25, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1995. 
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thesis argues that the process of enlargement is driven by political reasons and NATO 
should apply individual approach for every state's accession. 
Chapter III - Bulgaria and NATO: Assessing the Democratic Reforms in the 
Military Institution of Bulgaria - analyzes the ongoing military reforms in Bulgaria. The 
achieved and expected significant changes result not only in transformation of the size of 
the armed forces, their tasks, functions and structure, but also in the main elements of the 
institution building process concerning the professionalism and the way of thinking. The 
Civil-Military Reform in Bulgaria is considered the most important factor that prepares 
Bulgaria for the membership. The newly adopted Plan 200423 reflects the real measures, 
which will make the membership a reality. 
Chapter IV - The Impact of Kosovo Crisis and the Bulgarian Foreign Policy 
towards Accession - offers an analysis of the threats and constrains, which the current 
events place upon Bulgaria, the dilemmas of the foreign policy and the cost of its 
decisions. Bulgaria stays firmly on the path towards NATO and is not embarrassed to 
demonstrate this orientation. The frustration will appear if Bulgaria will not be able to 
meet the criteria for membership or if its accession is delayed because of other players' 
political lobbies or interests. 
Chapter V - Conclusion - There are three conclusions that can be drawn and will 
be discussed in this thesis concerning the enlargement of NATO and the potential 
23 Decree of the Ministers' Council No. 200, Plan for Organizational Development of the Armed Forces 
until 2004 according to the Appendix (Top Secret), The State Gazette, Number 98, Sofia, 12 November 
1999. 
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Bulgarian membership: a) the membership in NATO is the only way of insuring the 
security of Bulgaria; b) the participation in the PfP Program and other NATO activities is 
enough to guarantee the security of Bulgaria, and c) Bulgaria can be a neutral state and 
membership in NATO is not necessary for the defense and security of Bulgaria. 
This thesis supports the first enumerated conclusion that Euro-Atlantic 
membership remains vital to Bulgaria. This country can have no enduring peace and 
security outside the Alliance. Bulgaria has made strides to become a center of stability in 
a region of past and present tensions in the hope that Bulgarians can make their full 
contribution to the eradication of such tension from this region of Europe in the decades 
to come. In this respect Bulgaria hopes to emulate the example as elsewhere in European 
borders lands of violence in the past decade. The thesis argues that the changes in the 
democratic and military aspects in Bulgaria might still not be in perfect accordance with 
the provided Euro-Atlantic criteria, but the country has made significant steps and 
continues to reform. The thesis points out the weaknesses and makes recommendations 
for the further integration in the organization. 
12 
II. NATO ENLARGEMENT -THE NEW CHALLENGES 
The failure of the model of "real socialism", the disappearance of the Soviet 
Union from the political map, and the end of the Cold War resulted in profound changes 
in the international political, economical and security systems. The Warsaw Pact 
disappeared in 199124 and left its former members and the newly emerging countries in a 
security vacuum. The new players were too weak to face the new tensions, political and 
economical instabilities and security risks and logically they started seeking guarantees 
and insurance for the peace, which they can receive only in alliance with the system of 
collective defense that has already proved its viability. The stage set for confrontation 
needed to be rearranged and a framework needed to be created that can blur and soften 
the edges of the interests of US and western and Russian power in Europe.25 
These lead to the need to be established a new security architecture in and for 
Europe and reconsideration of the existing military institutions because the West also 
intended to promote security and stability in Europe and to expand the democratic system 
and values. 
NA TO, surviving this exciting historical time, turned out to be the means for 
"preserving and extending this "European Civil Space" as far as possible in both time af1d 
24 Protocol of the Termination of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, signed at Warsaw, 1 July 1991. 
25 Goodby, James, "Can Collective Security Work?," Managing Global Chaos, p. 243, United States 
Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 1998. 
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terrain.26" But it was not the only task and dilemma it has to resolve. The elimination of 
the primary threats in the former bipolar model of international relations that NATO was 
created to meet according to its founding Act - the basics for the Treaty of Washington 
1949 - had to be reconsidered. The defense capabilities of the organization has to be kept, 
but focused and adequate to the new political environment; ready to accept new missions 
ranging from peacekeeping to prevention of terrorism and organized crime. The fragile 
and uncertain relation with Russia had to be reconsidered and efforts had to be made to 
keep Russia in the arena of the democratic changes. Thus from a mainly defense oriented 
organization NATO turns out to be an influential institution with decisively political 
functions. The last summit in Washington in April 1999 analyzed NATO's achievements, 
defined its new role and determined some of the future key issues of its long-term agenda. 
NATO changed and adapted its internal civil and military structures, reshaped its posture 
of forces and echelons for combat and peace support operations. In the process, NATO 
made these units more flexible, capable of addressing multiple tasks and missions and 
more operational in the context of the challenges of the 1990s and beyond. 27 The 
Alliance redefined its attitude towards the other nation-states (players in the complex 
international arena), accepted three new members, and declared its policy of enlargement. 
NATO's "door remained open" for other nations to join in the future. 
26 The U.S. Ambassador Hunter, Robert, "Enlarging NATO: Reckless Or Requisite?." Available (Online): 
[http://www.fas.org/rnan/nato/index.html]. 20 January 2000. 
27 For more information see - The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and 
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington on 23-24 April 1999. 
Available (Online): [htpp://www.otan.nato.int/docu/com/.htm]. 20 January 2000. 
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A. THE PROCESS OF ENLARGEMENT 
The idea of enlargement is not something new for the Alliance. It is a part of the 
task to promote democratic values and a result of the process of consolidation of 
democracy on global scale when "unprecedented number of countries have completed 
democratic transitions"28. Its legal roots lay in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty: 
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state 
in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the 
security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.29 
Here one can see the criteria and the procedure for membership as the 
founding twelve states created it. 
The first steps of the enlargement started in the years of the Cold War in 1952 with 
the accession of Greece and Turkey, then the accession of the Federal Republic of 
Germany in 1955 and the accession of Spain in 1982. The historical period gives its 
military or political explanation to the strategic admission of these countries. 
What provokes or makes possible the current wave and the contemporary 
continuation of the process of NATO expansion also lies among the historical events of 
the millennium and in the changes of the bipolar political modeJ.30 The first attempts to 
define the attitude of the Alliance towards the new democracies and to introduce the 
28 Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p. 6, The 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996. 
29NATO Office oflnformation and Press, NATO Handbook, 1999, Appendix 8. 
30 Croft, Stuart, Redmond, John, Wyn Rees, G., Webber, Mark, The Enlargement of Europe, pp .. 22-48, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 1999. 
15 
policy of the open dialogue were made m 1990. In the NATO's London Summit 
Declaration the Allies stated: 
We today also invite the governments of the USSR, the Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic, the Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, the 
People's Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to come to NATO not just to 
visit, but to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. This will 
make it possible for us to share with them our thinking and deliberations in 
this historic period of changes. Our Alliance will do its share to overcome 
the legacy of decades of suspicion. 31 
The Allies stayed firmly behind the idea to foster democratic reforms in Europe, 
peace and stability and to create a better climate for economic growth. The establishment 
ofNACC in 1991 at the summit in Rome (it turned later in 1997 into EAPC with new and 
extended role) was a logical continuation of their efforts. The US foreign policy initiated 
the "open door policy" debate and "by late 1990 NATO enlargement has already been 
considered as follow-on to NACC"32. Probably the most important among other activities 
was the summit in Brussels in 1994 which launched the initiative "Partnership-for-Peace" 
(PfP) and the confirmation of the expansion to the East as natural event: 
We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to 
democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking 
into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.33 
31 NATO Information Service, London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, July 1990. 
Available (Online): [htpp://www.nato.int/docu/comm!c91067a/htm]. 20 January 2000. 
32 Solomon, Gerald, The NA TO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997: Blessings of Liberty, p. 19, Praeger 
Publishers, Westport, 1998. 
33 NA TO, Final Communique, North Atlantic Council, M-NAC-2, No.6, 1 December 1994. Available 
(Online): [htpp:/www.nato.int/docu/commlc94120la.htm]. 20 January 2000. 
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Leading analysts of politics and society Central and Eastern Europe conclude that 
the states of Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe have long identified themselves with 
the history, culture, and politics of the Western tradition. Tragically, the makers of peace 
in 1945, in a short sighted fashion, forcefully broke these bonds of society and culture, 
and thus disrupted these natural links to the west. The settlement put in hand by the anti-
Axis allies in the years 1944-46 led quickly thereafter to the outbreak of the Cold war and 
to the disappearance behind the Iron Curtain of the subject peoples of the Soviet system. 
With the end of the Soviet Union's hegemony, the states sought their democratic 
roots but the process of democratization is not an easy one. All the states faced a political 
and economic crisis because of a "flattened civic society" and lack of maturity in the "five 
interacting arenas"34 necessary for the consolidation of democracy. These arenas are the 
establishment of a civil, economic and political society, the rule of law and a working 
government. Without ties to the West European and Atlantic institutions, the East 
European geopolitical space will become a no-man's-land between the "so called" West 
and Russia. The instability in Central and Eastern Europe also will have a negative impact 
upon the West unless liberal democracies are established in the former "communist" zone. 
To be economically and politically viable, these states need the European Union, and for 
their security they need the Atlantic Alliance. Since most members of the European Union 
are members of NATO, and since the European integration has also reached a certain 
point and the European defense is tightly linked with NATO, membership in the European 
34 See Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p. 7, The 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996. 
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Union will lead to at least de facto extension of the NATO guarantee. These two 
processes mutually influence each other. But the players in them from both sides were and 
are not ready yet. 
Some scholars like Kissinger, though he personally is very conservative towards 
NATO enlargement, argue that the victory in the Cold War has made it far more difficult 
to implement Woodrow Wilson's dream of universal collective security and that PfP is not 
a path to NATO, but an alternative to it35. He also states that the Partnership for Peace 
runs the risk of creating two sets of borders in Europe - those that are protected by 
security guarantees, and others where such guarantees have been refused - a state of 
affairs bound to prove tempting to potential aggressors and demoralizing to potential 
victims. 
The administration of President Clinton offered in 1994 the PfP program, arguing 
that NATO could not afford to "draw a new line between East and West that could create 
a self-fulfilling prophecy of future confrontation. 1136 It invited all the states from Eastern 
Europe to join the initiative37 aiming to create a substitute of a collective security system 
and to prepare the eventual new members for their admission. The initiative introduced 
the concrete steps of the new security relationship: 
35 See Kissinger, H., Diplomacy, p. 824, Simon and Schuster, Inc., NY, 1994. 
36 Goldgeiger, James M., "NA TO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision", The Washington Quarterly, 
pp .. 85-102, Winter 1998. 
37 For more information about that process see Goldgeiger, James M., Not Whether but When: The US 
Decision to Enlarge NATO, Washington, D.C., 1999. 
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... we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defense 
budgeting, promoting democratic control of defense ministries, joint 
planning and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such 
fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations ... 38 
The PfP initiative indicated the good will of the NA TO members to help the 
former Warsaw Pact states, including the Soviet Union-successors' states, to transfo~ 
their armed forces and to integrate into Euro-Atlantic values while participating together 
in different activities. The initiative promoted democratic civil-military control and called 
for cooperation and interoperability of the armed forces with NATO member- nations' 
forces. Its objectives in the long-term turned to be not only military but also political -
fostering friendship and stability beyond Europe: 
Through the PfP the East and the West seek to build the habits of 
consultation, trust and cooperation .... There is, however, more to the PfP 
than military exercises and activities. We aim to provide our experience 
and expertise to the new democracies in creating democratically organized 
and accountable Ministries ofDefense.39 
The former adversaries in a short time learned how to work together and to apply 
the democratic approaches in order to resolve problems and crisis of mutual importance. 
38 NATO, Declaration of the Heads of State and Governments issued by NAC in Brussels, Belgium, Press 
Communique M-1(94)3, 11 January 1994, Available (Online): 
[htpp:/www.nato.int/docu/commlc94011 la.htm]. 15 February 2000. 
39 Claes, Willy, "NATO and the Evolving Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture," NATO Review, No.I, 
Jnuary 1995, Available (Online): [htpp://www.nato.int.docu/review/articles/9501-l.html]. 15 February 
2000. 
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But at the inception of the "Partnership for Peace" in January 1994, the creators of 
the program in Brussels shied away from the offer of traditional security guarantees to the 
Partners. The PfP program could not substitute the membership in the organization. PfP 
was only able to provide the framework for evaluating the states willing to join NATO 
and a framework for cooperation for all those nations not willing to join NATO. 
The next step was the Brussels' ministerial meeting in December 1994 where the 
opening of the Alliance to new members was officially announced. But universally valid 
criteria for accession, giving answers to the questions "who", "why", "how" and "when", 
were not explicitly developed as was declared in Brussels: 
We have decided to initiate a process of examination inside the Alliance to 
determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide the process and 
the implication of membership.40 
Even the questions "who" and "when" were left without discussion as premature, 
until 1995 when the "Study of NATO Enlargement"4 l examined the "why and how" and 
outlined the principles of the admission. One can argue that according to NATO's 
founding Act - the Washington Treaty, Art. 10 - there are no criteria for admission except 
for the general ones and it is unfair to apply such now and that the individual approach is 
a better solution. The previous practice of the Alliance to accept members because of 
geostrategic considerations despite the fact that, for example, they were ruled by 
dictatorship regimes and did not fit the criteria of being a consolidated democracy such as 
40 NATO, Final Communique, North Atlantic Council, M-NAC-2, 1 Dec.1994, No.6. Available (Online): 
[htpp:/www.nato.int/docu/comm/c94120la.htm]. 15 February 2000. 
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Portugal as a founding member, and later likewise vis-a-vis Greece and Turkey in 1952, 
was reconsidered though. 
Analyzing the political and historical moment in 1994 is obvious that NATO itself 
was not prepared. The process was improvised on step-by step basis, the improvisation 
aimed to govern the pace of international events. The moment was suitable strategically 
for the frontline to be moved towards Russia and to stabilize the core of Europe but the 
Alliance was not ready to change its raison d'etre as an organization of collective defense. 
NATO was developing its main core function forwards an organization of cooperative 
security, but NATO was not yet willing to become a system of collective security, 
spreading its umbrella over all the PfP states42 and the PfP program was never intended 
to offer security guarantees: 
As it increases the number of members and the geographic scope of 
operations, the alliance gradually loses its restrictive character and begins 
to take on the attributes of a CSO (collective security organization). More 
states and greater territorial coverage mean more contingencies to guard 
against43. 
41 NATO, Study of NATO Enlargement, Brussels, 1995. 
42 Actually there are 25 PfP-partner nations. By December 1999 Ireland joined as 25th actual PfP-partner 
nation, mean while Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as former PfP-partners became NATO 
members. 
43 Art, Robert J., "Creating a Disaster: NATO's Open Door Policy", Political Science Quarterly, volume 
113, number 3, p. 395, 1998. 
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It became clear that the organization itself needed internal adaptation and 
transformation. It needed to decide what would be the new concept and strategy of the 
expanded organization. 
Russia, considering itself a "great power" and still being a nuclear one, also 
opposed a broad enlargement. Russia declared its fears concerning expansion to the Baltic 
states and some states considered as Russian zone of interest although its relation with 
NATO was well organized with the NATO - Russia Founding Act from 1997. The crisis 
in Kosovo in 1999 aggravated very much that cooperation to the freezing point. 
After internal debates about the pros and cons the Madrid summit in 1997 gave the 
official answer to the question of "who" will be the first round of new members44. Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic were officially admitted to NATO on 12 of March 1999 
and the members became nineteen. 
The evolution of the "Partnership" in practice alongside the deepening crisis in 
ex-Yugoslavia led to a further strengthening of Partners' ties to the Alliance, especially in 
the midst of the March 1999 war. Nonetheless, for such Partners as Slovakia, Romania 
and Bulgaria, the post-1998 expansion of non-Article 5 aspects of NATO within PfP can 
still be no substitute for the full-fledged guarantee of collective defense enshrined in 
Article 5. of the Washington Treaty. Hence, PfP can never supplant the full membership 
as enjoyed by the nineteen NATO nations. 
44 NA TO, Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation. Madrid, 8 July 1997. 
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B. THE CHALLENGES OF THE POSSIBLE NEXT ROUND OF 
ENLARGEMENT 
The list of the potential member states, which at the Washington summit 1999 
declared their firm will to join, is still long. The countries applying for membership want 
to live under NATO's protective umbrella and the security guarantee mostly coming from 
the United States. The membership for them means political self-confidence, being a part 
of the democratic community of nations, values and institutions. It means stability and 
security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic region. But the candidates, the so-called 
"have-nots" need the consensus of the members which means that any new membership is 
a matter of geopolitical and geostrategic interests, negotiations and political lobbyism. 
The Washington Summit posed serious challenges for the candidates in the form 
of greater differentiation among the PfP partners45 - they were divided in 9 Membership 
Action Plan (MAP) states and 15 non-MAP states. The nine countries in the list - Albania, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, 
continue with the reforms in their political and military structures in order to achieve 
interoperability with NATO and to be able in short-term to meet the responsibilities and 
the obligation of the future membership. The initiation in 1999 of NATO's Membership 
Action Plan46 - a program of activities for assistance of the aspiring countries, will help 
45 The status of the PfP members as it is in April 1999. 
46 NATO, Membership Action Plan (MAP), Press Communique NAC-S(99)66. Available (Online): 
[htpp:/www.otan.nato.int]. 15 February 2000. 
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them to build the strongest possible candidacy. For some of the states the membership is a 
matter of survival47 because the refusal might compromise the democratic changes. 
The Washington summit raised a lot of questions and uncertainties. The 
organization felt that the enlargement burdens the intra-alliance relationships and the new 
members will tend to reorganize the Alliance and the ability to generate consensus. The 
war in Kosovo and the position of NATO was a difficult test for such defense 
cooperation. The new tasks were in conflict with the national interests and objectives. 
They provoked conflicts inside NATO and can do that in the future when mutual strategic 
interests are not clearly defined. It was obvious that some of the new members were not 
prepared as Hungary and the Czech Republic for example were feared to become "free 
riders1148 and not able to contribute to the military security in NATO. They were 
especially behind in defense reform and budgeting. 
Both the members and the aspirants must very carefully assess the cost and 
benefits of the process of enlargement. There are lots of voices against49 future accession 
of new members because of the existing internal problems of NATO the new members 
own failures will probably slow down the process of enlargement, despite the efforts of 
the new aspirants and MAP countries. The April 1999 meeting of the North Atlantic 
47 Simon, Jeffrey, "Central and Eastern European Security", Strategic Forum, Number. 151, p. 4, 1998. 
48 Simon, Jeffrey, "The New NATO Members: Will They Contribute?," Strategic Forum, Number. 160, p. 
2, 1999. 
49 Kay, Sean, NATO and the Future of European Security, p. 103, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
Maryland, 1998. 
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Council determined that the next round of Enlargement would be taken up, at the latest, at 
the next summit meeting of the NAC to be held in 2002. The question remains, 
nonetheless, in NATO and Partner capitals whether there will even be a second round of 
Enlargement; further, if, indeed, there is to be such a second round as policy seems to 
indicate, then the questions of "when" and "who" remain to be answered50, as well. The 
aspiring nations will remain under active consideration51 for future membership and no 
European democratic state, whose admission will fulfill the objectives of the Washington 
Treaty, will be excluded from consideration. Definitely the choice will be influenced by 
the political preferences of the national interests of the member-states. 
The accession of Bulgaria will be influenced by the last international events and 
the positive aspects emerging out of the Kosovo war as the implementation of the 
Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, the initiation of the accession talks of Bulgaria 
with the EU, and the heightening interest of the U.S.A. in Southeastern Europe52, neither 
of which was operative in 1997-1999. 
50 NATO, An Alliance for the 21st Century, Press Communique NAC-S (99) 64, Issued by the Heads of 
States and Government Participating in the Meeting ofNAC in Washington, D.C., 24 April 1999. 
5 I There was not taken a decision for a definite enlargement, but a decision for eventual enlargement might 
be taken on the next Summit in 2002. 
52 Action Plan for Southeastern Europe, announced by the White House on the occasion of Bulgarian 
President Stoyanov's visit to the United States, p. 4, 10 February 1998. 
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C. FOUR DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO NATO "SOFT" EXPANSION53 
There are long lasting political and scholarly debates concerning the next round of 
enlargement54 and theoretically different approaches: 
1. Pause before enlarging to put relations with Russia on a firmer footing; 
2. Enlarge with one or two states and then have a lengthy pause for a period of 
consolidation; 
3. Enlarge in a series of relatively fast-paced accessions that would include most 
of the current applicants while Russia's relationship with NATO remains as defined in the 
NATO-Russia Charter, or while Russia is weak; 
4. Enlarge gradually, ultimately including a firmly democratic Russia after a 
period of demonstrated stability. 
The first approach is favored by many that think NATO enlargement is 
dangerously premature. The second approach is the most likely outcome. The Russian 
opposition to accession to NATO of any newly independent state that emerged from the 
collapse of the Soviet Union there will be considerable hesitation, at least in W estem 
Europe, about a broad second round of expansion. The third approach - expansion to 
include nearly all the applicants - is a possible if less certain outcome. 
53 Rudolf, Peter, "The Future of US as European Power: The Case of NATO Enlargement", European 
Security, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 175-195, 1996. 
54 The opinions of the opponents of enlargement will not be discussed here. 
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Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, are considered the possible candidates for 
the next round. But they need to have almost certain unanimous support. And there will 
be hesitations about adding the Baltic States and Ukraine. 
The fourth approach - an expansion that ultimately would include a democratic 
Russia has few real supporters. 
After evaluating the individual candidatures according to their recent political 
activities, 55 an intellectual guess can be made that: 
Albania and Macedonia cannot be regarded as prepared candidates because of 
internal instabilities; 
Slovakia is recently performing well economically and made a sharp curve 
towards democracy with the ouster ofMeciar, and might catch up with the first group; 
The Baltic states face problems with the attitude of Russia56 and their accession 
will be postponed; 
Romania is recently falling behind and faces problems with the reforms57; 
Bulgaria and Slovenia are advancing considerably well with their reforms, 
especially Slovenia; 
Slovenia alone is an option or together with Bulgaria and possibly Romania have 
chances to be the first group to be accepted. This will make a very strong Southeastern 
55 For its analysis this thesis reflects the events from 1999 and the beginning of2000. 
56 Gordon, Philip, NATO's Transformation, p. 158, Rowman, Littlefield Publishers, Inc., London, 1997. 
57 "Romania and Bulgaria: The Tortoise and the Hare", The Economist, 7 August 1999. Available (Online): 
[http://www.economist.com/tfs/archive _ tframeset.html]. 10 February 2000. 
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flank of NATO along with Greece and Turkey. The behavior of some of the aspiring 
states as Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania, during the Kosovo crisis and their support of 
the NATO activities now gives them certain advantages and also political engagement on 
behalf of the Alliance, as the recent visit of President Clinton in this region showed. 
Bulgaria being a "front-line state" made its commitments to Euro-Atlantic policy and 
along with the economic stabilization is now seen as a reliable partner. 
But probably the most recent date for acceptance is 2001 or 200258 and besides 
the fulfillment of requirements, a candidate will need the political sponsorship of the 
NATO members. The applicants will have to secure the unanimous consensus of all 
nineteen NATO members and the US Senate and the international political relationships 
will have enormous influence. The analysis of the political situation shows different 
connections between the players not only influenced by their geopolitical positions as seen 
on the map. Though speculative, an intellectual guess can be made to estimate the attitude 
of the member-states towards the aspirants. For example Italy, Portugal and Spain are 
favoring large expansion. The UK will support a small expansion and supports Slovenia 
and Bulgaria, while Germany, Greece and Turkey, concerned about the Southern rim of 
NATO will like Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia to be in the next round. 59 France and 
Netherlands are for stabilizing the Balkans with the accession of Slovenia and Romania, 
58 Speech by Lord Robertson, the Secretary General of NATO at the Bulgarian National Assembly, 10 
February 2000. Available (Online):[http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/s000210a.html]. 20 February 2000. 
59 "Romania and Bulgaria: The Tortoise and the Hare", The Economist, 7 August 1999. Available (Online): 
[http://www.economist.com/tfs/archive _ tframeset.html]. 10 February 2000. 
28 
Belgium and Canada support the same states, while Denmark and Iceland support the 
Baltic States. Norway is not yet convinced that any of the candidates is ready to become a 
member. The US officials dedared that the US would support every state that is ready for 
the acceptance. 
In addition, because it is implausible to admit nine new members in the near term, 
the North Atlantic Council (NAC) must find a way to successfully deal with the 
expectations and needs of the MAP partners. 
D. WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE EUROPEAN STATES THAT 
AREN'T INVITED INTO NAT060? 
This is a reasonable question because instability in only one European country can 
cause problems and instability on the continent. The candidates still face a lot of 
challenges in their military reforms61. Compared to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic, which downsized their armed forces before their entrance into NATO, the MAP 
partners either must still downsize (Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia) or build armed 
forces from scratch (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Slovenia). Albania and Macedonia 
fall into yet a third MAP subgroup with different problems.62 
60 See Yost, David, NATO Transformed, US Institute of Peace, Washington DC, pp .. 118-119, 1998. 
6! Simon, Jeffrey, "Central and Eastern European Security", Strategic Forum, Number 151, National 
Defense University, December 1998. 
62 Simon, Jeffrey," Partnership For Peace (PFP): After the Washington Summit and Kosovo", Strategic 
Forum, Number 167, National Defense University, August 1999. 
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As the reduction of the partners' armed forces result in social complexities, NATO 
may become the object of blame. It has to be admitted that for the modern standards most 
of the armies really are too heavy and numerous but not effective, and their reduction is not a 
NATO requirement. If NATO ultimately does not recompense with an invitation, some 
MAP partners, restructuring their Armed Forces as if part of NATO may end up with 
weak and disconcerted forces. Such forces will not be able to fulfill their constitutional 
duties and will have little utility in helping the state deal with its own security. 
If any or all of the MAP aspirants fail to receive membership invitations, they will 
likely be disillusioned, resulting in a cleavage of the MAP partners from the Alliance. 
Some MAP partners have expressed doubt about NATO efforts to develop regional 
cooperation in the Baltic region and South Eastern Europe and fear that efforts to 
regionalize will undermine the fulfillment of their enlargement objective. 
Most of the states, following the example of Spain63 in 1982 also seek 
membership to strengthen democracy and achieve possible opportunity to enter the 
European Union. 
The prime task of NATO is to secure the peace and stability in Europe. The states 
have to know that the enlargement is a process, not a one-time event as U.S. Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright made it clear: 
63 Fouquet, David, "A Brief History ofNATO Enlargement", Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 July 1997. 
Available (Online): [http://www.janes.com/company/search/searchset.html]. 15 February 2000. 
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Today, as NATO embarks upon a new era, our energy and vision are 
directed to the future. It is our common purpose over time to do for 
Europe's East what NATO has already helped to do for Europe's West. 
Steadily and systematically we will continue erasing, without replacing, 
the line drawn in Europe by Stalin's bloody boot. 64 
Those states that were not invited to join NATO are not denied membership 
forever. NATO will continue and strengthen its "intensified dialogues" with interested 
countries to ensure they receive specific information to better prepare them to join the 
Alliance. 
NATO also will continue enhancing its Partnership for Peace (PfP) program that 
builds military cooperation and confidence between NATO and its Partner states across 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
NATO has pursued new cooperative agreements with certain European states that 
have not sought NATO membership, such as with Ukraine. 
The process will continue because adding new states to NATO will bolster 
stability and democracy in Europe. Partly to improve their prospects for membership, the 
applicant states have settled border and ethnic disputes with neighbors, strengthened 
civilian control of their militaries, and broadened protections for ethnic and religious 
minorities. Such actions not only make Europe more stable and peaceful, but also create a 
better long-term climate for global trade and investment. 
64 As cited by Bransten, Jeremy, "I 999 Jn Review: New Challenges As NATO Moves East." Available 
(Online): [http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999/12/F.RU.991220150049.html]. 10 January 2000. 
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Enlarging NATO will erase Stalin's artificial dividing line in Europe. NATO 
enlargement will help prevent the emergence of a gray zone of insecurity in Europe and 
especially in regions that has been at the heart of this century's worst conflicts. 
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III. BULGARIA AND NATO: ASSESSING THE DEMOCRATIC 
REFORMS IN THE MILITARY INSTITUTION OF BULGARIA 
After the domino-like collapse in 1989 - 1991 of the communist system, most of 
the countries in Central and Eastern Europe began their transition towards democracy 
under the influence of international factors before significant domestic changes occurred 
in their society65. The world changes reflected in Bulgaria with a regime-controlled 
transition in 1989 from early-post totalitarianism towards consolidated democracy in 
199566. During that period, the democratic institution building process slowly and 
painfully started the military reform in Bulgaria and the establishment of democratic 
civilian control over the armed force. This involved the restructuring of the military roles 
to assistance in the formulation and implementation of the national defense policy67 and 
the removal of the military from societal to institutional concerns, the legal basis for 
which were the new Constitution (1991) and the Defense and Armed Forces Law (1995). 
In 1994 Bulgaria joined the Partnership for Peace initiative but was reluctant to 
take steps towards membership in NATO because ofth~prevailing negative attitude in the 
Parliament and even as of this writing the Bulgarian Socialist Party does not yet have a 
clear position. 
65 Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p. 235, The John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996. 
66 Ibid., pp .. 333-341. 
67 Aguero, Felipe, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, p. 20, The John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore and London, 199 5. 
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In 1997 after heavy economic crisis, the general elections brought into power a 
new Bulgarian government formed by the political movement Union of the Democratic 
Forces, which stated the nation's desire to become a member of the Atlantic Alliance and 
its readiness to be invited to start accession negotiations. 
Most of the former Warsaw pact nations from Central and Eastern Europe that 
seek to join EU and NATO have made strong declarations of their commitment to the 
principles and values of OSCE, European Union, NATO and to the security of the NATO 
area. These declarations have been made by successive governments and oppositions and 
generally represent solid national consensus. These declarations are matched by such 
actions, as sustained democratic and market reforms, efforts to improve relations with 
neighbors, and efforts to deepen civilian control of the military, restructuring their armies 
and achieving interoperability with NATO. 
Because of the lack of political consensus over the military priorities, without a 
formulated National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine put into place, Bulgaria was 
very much behind the other states in its reforms on the way towards NATO. The past 
choices of the military alliances in which Bulgaria participated during the historical period 
from its establishment after the Ottoman yoke in 1878, through WWI and WWII till the 
end of Warsaw pact additionally burdened the hesitations of the political decision. The 
legacy of the past had made Bulgaria very cautious when choosing partners. Bulgaria and 
the other countries of the region had been victims of the egoistic interests of the Great 
Powers. Bulgaria emerged as a state in 1878 after a shameful deal of the Bismarck's 
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policy68, which left more than half of the Bulgarian nation and territories (Thrace, 
Macedonia, Dobrudga) partitioned within the boundaries of other neighboring states. The 
nations' desire for unification was one of the reasons for the choice of the alliances during 
the Balkan war, in the WWI, partially the same desire motivated the participation in the 
WWII on the side of Hitler's Germany and the Axis. After Yalta's conference in 194569, 
the Great Powers' dividing Europe into two zones again decided the future of Bulgaria as 
part of the Soviet bloc. All the previous bad choices and alliances with Germany in two 
world wars and with the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact lead the country to three 
national catastrophes in which Bulgaria lost great parts of its territory and suffered heavy 
economic losses. The past suggests that military alliances, which are based on 
hegemonism and aggression, cannot solve the problems and the struggles between the 
weak, vulnerable, and insecure nations in Southeastern Europe. The legacy of ethnic 
tension, political diversity, and fragmentation is deeply ingrained there and the region 
needs integration into the European identity, into EU and NATO as collective 
organizations of equal partners, integration, whiCh will breed trust, stability and prosperity 
and stimulate the development and stabilization of democracy. With the process of 
enlargement of EU and NATO Bulgaria received the opportunity to change the paradigm 
of the past. 
68 Craig, Gordon and George, Alexander, Force and Statecraft, pp. 33-35, Oxford University Press, Inc., 
New York, 1995. 
69 Nye, Joseph S.,Jr., Understanding International Conflicts, p. 104, Longman, New York, 1997. 
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In 1997 realizing the geopolitical and economic constrains for Bulgaria, the 
Government of Ivan Kostov started its ambitious program 70 for integration with EU and 
NATO. The political authorities had the clear notion that the security of the state should 
be sought in participation in these international organizations, not in neutrality or under 
the postulates of maintaining a large national military power, for which there was not a 
strategic need neither were financial resources. 
In the short-term the objectives for Bulgaria were to create domestic conditions for 
consolidating democracy and stabilizing a market economy, to prove this image in the 
international arena and to become one of the unquestionable leaders and guarantors of 
stability and security in the region. The Secretary General of NATO Javier Solana 
pointed: 
... despite of domestic difficulties, Bulgaria is ready to end the vicious 
circle of hatred and conflict that has been the bane of the Balkans for 
centuries.71 
The military structures as main tool for fulfillment of these objectives were to be 
put in alliance with this program, to catch up with the time and to prepare to be part of the 
Euro-Atlantic security institutions. 
70 Program of the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria 1997-2001. Available 
(Online ):[http://www.bulgaria.govrn.bg/eng/oficial_ docs/index.html]. 10 February 2000 
71 NATO, Secretary General's Council Welcoming Remarks, 1997. Available (Online): 
[http:/www.nato.iint/docu]. 14 March 1999. 
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A. BULGARIAN MILITARY REFORMS AND RELATIONS 
WITH NATO IN THE PERIOD PRIOR 1998 
In the fall of 1991 the Bulgarian Armed Forces totaled 107,000 soldiers with 
46,000 professionals and until 1998 remained at this level72. Very little was done to 
change the orientation of the structure of the Armed forces from "offensive" to 
"defensive" concepts and to introduce the "brigade-corps" form of organization. The 
creation and development of the basic documents as National Security Concept and 
Military Doctrine, which were supposed to formulate the main principles for the 
architecture of the Armed forces and their tasks, took a long time. 
The military reforms were vague and ambiguous and the numerous changes in the 
governments and the Ministers of Defense 73 were an obstacle for providing a stable 
course of well-formulated and understood in short-terms and long-terms objectives of the 
reform. This was due not only to the individual qualities and the administrative skills of 
the civilian officials but also to the different political platforms, which the Ministers were 
supposed to implement. The officers' corps was desperately trying to survive in the 
strategic vacuum left by the end of the Warsaw Pact, without and not understanding its 
new strategic tasks, aiming to keep the prerogatives and privileges that they had inherited 
from the previous regime. 
72 Simon, Jeffrey, "Bulgaria and NATO: 7 Lost Years", Strategic Forum, no. 142, p. 3, 1998. 
73 From 1991until2000 for 9 years Bulgaria had 7 Ministers of Defense from different political parties and 
platforms. 
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The "Programme for Reforms" was adopted with a Decree of the Council of the 
Ministers No. 216 on the 15th of November 1995, which stipulates: "The Council of the 
Ministers enacts: Adopts the concept of reformation of the Bulgarian Armed Forces until 
year 2010 according to the Appendix (Top secret)"74. This Programme was not discussed 
in the Parliament or in public but the reduction of the forces was estimated to be to 
75,000. 
At the same time because of lack of maturity and experience the civic society was 
not yet able to answer the question "who guards the guardians?" and to establish sufficient 
and effective civilian control over the areas of security and national defense including 
institutions, process and cultural support. The civilian supremacy of civilians, elected by 
the general population over these areas is central to any democracy75 and particularly for 
Bulgaria, where the military occupied prominent positions during the totalitarian regime. 
The Constitution (1991) and the Defense and Armed Forces Law (1995) regulate 
the division of powers and enact their prerogatives concerning security matters, the 
budget, and the number and the engagement of the Armed Forces in operations abroad. 
The reform had to clarify the lines of authority between the new institutions - the National 
Assembly, the President as Supreme Commander and the Government (Prime Minister 
and civilian Defense Minister), the Chief of the General staff in peacetime and in wartime, 
but was not efficient enough. For example, the pro-NATO president Zhelev was in 
74 Decree of the Council of the Ministers No. 216, The State Gazette, Sofia, 15 November 1995. 
75 Aguero, Felipe, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, p. 17, The John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore and London, 1995. 
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different positions with the ex-communist government76 and some of the military 
reforms, personnel reduction or promotions of officers were used as a bargaining chip 
between the political powers. The first civilian Minister of Defense entered the "military 
fortress" in 1991 and gradually started the process of building the civil-military 
relationship. 
The real and actual power relations between the General Staff and the civilian 
administration for a long time stayed unclear for peacetime and especially very vague and 
ambiguous in times of war. The constant collision between the General Staff and the 
civilian leadership of the Ministry of Defense often resulted in impotent cosmetic 
changes, not affecting the heavy structure of the Armed Forces and most of them 
remained on paper. Such interference not only dropped the effectiveness of the military 
forces and thus the nation's security, but also actually invited the military to involve itself 
in governance beyond national security affairs. 
But gradually and especially after the amendments of the Defense and Armed 
Forces Law the civilian control proved its effectiveness. The Constitutional Court in 
addition issued several decisions, which settled some of the ambiguities of the 
Constitution and the collisions of powers, especially concerning the participation of the 
Armed forces abroad. 
The civil control system was tested successfully in 1997 when the Chief of the 
General Staff General Totomirov was relieved to introduce the principle of "three years 
76 Solomon, Gerald, The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997: Blessings of Liberty, p. 45, Praeger 
Publishers, Westport, 1998. 
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rotation" for the Chief of the General Staff'77. The authorities - the President and the 
executive branch (Minister of Defense and Prime Minister)- proved that they could work 
in consensus. The civilian control also proved its viability recently when in 1998 
President Petar Stoyanov relieved the Commander of the rocket forces General Marin for 
openly criticizing the ongoing military reform and the governmental political decisions for 
membership in NATQ78, which action was supported by the Government. 
The creation of such. new bodies as Military Cabinet of the President and a 
Council for National Security in 1998 to help the Ministers' Council additionally 
strengthened the civilian control. The Cabinet of the President includes active duty 
officers, one of them is the former Chief of General staff and civilians as the former 
Minister of Defense G. Ananiev. The Council for National Security includes the ministers 
and their deputies of foreign affairs, defense, and interior, and other experts. Their tasks 
are to analyze and predict the potential risks for national security. In this way the capacity 
and the expertise of the civilian authorities concerning security matters was increased. The 
legislative branch - the National Assembly - still lacks such a think-tank of experts and 
the MPs have limited military experience and abilities to critically asses the force 
structure or the military budget 79. 
77 Simon, Jeffrey, "Bulgaria and NATO: 7 Lost Years", Strategic Forum, Number 142, 1998. 
78 "The President Dismissed General Marin," Sofia, Democracia, 12 March 1998. Available (Online): 
[http://www.democracia.com]. 15 February 1999. 
79 Simon, Jeffrey, "Bulgaria and NATO: 7 Lost Years", Strategic Forum, Number 142, p. 3, 1998. 
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The Defense Ministry lacked sufficient trained personnel with which to perform 
effective administrative functions though it had a large apparatus of 3000 persons (civilian 
and military)80 formally divided in three branches and General Staff, with overlapping 
and redundant directorates. The communications and transparency between them were 
very difficult and lumbering. 
The military capabilities of the Armed Forces were diminished because of a 
limited budget. The Bulgarian military budget and military spending were sharply 
'reduced. In the period between 1990 and 1996 the budget for defense was around 3% of 
the GDP of Bulgaria, but in 1997 and 1998 it became less than 2% of GDP81. That 
process was also part of the worldwide phenomenon of decline of the military spending as 
a share of GDP after the Cold War, but also a result of the economic crisis and condition 
of the Currency Board and the IMF agreement. Because of scarce resources most of the 
military equipment and armament was not maintained or renovated and the exercises and 
training of the forces were limited. The budget is an important constraint for the success 
of the modem military reform in Bulgaria. 
In 1994 Bulgaria joined the PfP Initiative and actively participated in the activities, 
but it did not apply for NATO membership, though the Bulgarian President earlier in 
1991 appealed for an association within the organization. In its early relation with NATO 
Bulgaria was interested in mutual consultations and dialogue. Although Bulgaria was an 
80 Ibid., p. 3. 
81 MOD, UK, DMCS, Parliamentarian Surveillance and Democratic Control of the Bulgarian Armed 
Forces and MOD, Research No. 3, p. 16, Sofia, 1998. 
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active participant, Bulgaria's main priorities were gaining access to interoperability 
information and re-orienting the arms industry, including co-production of weapons 
configured to NATO standards.82 
As a neighboring country to Yugoslavia, Bulgaria did not participate in the 
peacekeeping operations there and did not show interest in them until 1997. 
A new firm and single-alternative course of action for Bulgaria was launched by a 
decision of the Bulgarian Government, on 17 February 1997, to gain full membership in 
NATO. A National Program for Preparation and Accession in NATO was adopted on 17 
March 1997. 
The formulation of the national strategic goals in 1997, which were integration 
within the European Union and NA TO, required gigantic and drastic steps to catch up 
with the other applicants and the main NATO requirements. A significant portion of the 
public, who share the values, principles and objectives that the Alliance represents, 
support this policy and activities. Even lately while the airstrikes of NATO in Kosovo in 
1999 led to clashes of disagreement in the public opinion, the supporters for NATO 
membership were 46% of the population and 82% were for the integration with EU, 
according to the sociological analysis of "Alfa Research" agency in May 1999.83 
82 Solomon, Gerald, The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-97: Blessings of Liberty, p. 45, Praeger 
Publishers, Westport, Ct, 1998. 
83 Neshkova, Reni, "The Rationalism of the Bulgarians," Democracy, Number 119, 10 May 1999. 
Available (Online): [html.//digsys.bg/bgnews/search-rresult.html]. 19 February 2000. 
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The political desire for membership obviously forced and speeded up security, 
defense and military reforms in Bulgaria. Such reforms sought to: a) increase civilian 
expertise and military professionalism; b) reduce the total number of the Armed forces 
and switch to professional army; c) improve their mobility and training by establishing an 
efficient military education system; d) increase social status of the military personnel; e) 
provide comprehensive legal basis. Such reforms were urgently necessary for Bulgaria. 
These were the pillars of the current military reform as it was described by the 
Bulgarian Foreign Minister - N.Mihailova: 
Reform of the armed forces, strengthening of civilian control of the 
military and achieving interoperability with NATO forces are major 
priorities in this process. ,To this end, the Bulgarian parliament has 
introduced significant changes in national legislation concerning defence 
and the armed forces. 
The objective of this reform is to develop a highly mobile, more 
professional and well-equipped force, which is significantly reduced in 
size, in order to meet NATO standards. The force structure will include 
main defence, rapid reaction and territorial defence forces, as well as 
reserves. 84 
The redefined and approved by the Government in 1997 Defense Reform Program 
was envisioned to work until 2010 and to cut the military to 65,000. The Program was 
reviewed in the light of the requirements for possible NATO membership and achieving 
maximum interoperability with the Allied Forces. It aimed to restructure the Bulgarian 
B4 Mihailova, Nadezhda, "Security in South-Eastern Europe and Bulgaria's Policy ofNATO Integration", 
NATO Review, Webedition vol. 46, Number 1, pp .. 6-9, 1998. 
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forces into three Corps - Rapid Reaction Corps, First and Third Army Corps, to reduce the 
conscription, to enlist professionals and to modernize the armament and inventory85. 
The Program envisaged the transition to corps-brigade organization, redislocation 
and reduction of the structures of the General Staff and the services, the units and 
formations. It proposed development and approval of normative documents and reforming 
the military education system and scientific research activities, which should be done by 
year 2000. 
The Program included finalization of the structural reform in the services; 
modernization of the existing armament and rearmament of the Bulgarian Army; 
recruitment of the necessary personnel, improvement of the barracks and the training and 
education facilities from 2001 to 2010. At the end of the reform the Bulgarian Army 
would have rapid reaction forces ready to cover the state boundaries and provide the 
deployment of the main defense forces. The final goal was to have Armed Forces smaller 
in manpower as compared to the current manpower but combat ready Armed Forces 
having forces interoperable with those of NA TO member countries, Armed Forces that 
are able to prevent the involvement of the country in small and medium conflicts. At the 
same time the Armed Forces should be able to implement tasks having to do with the 
responsibilities resulting from the collective defense according to Art. 5 of the 
Washington treaty as well as participation in NATO operations other than that. 
85 Simon, Jeffrey, "Bulgaria and NATO: 7 Lost Years," Strategic Forum, no. 142, p. 3, 1998. 
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The following years and the events on the international stage again forced the pace 
of the Bulgarian military reform and changed its strategy. 
B. THE PLAN FOR ORGANIZATIONAL BUILDING AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF MOD UNTIL 2004 
The new current trends of transformation process of the security and military 
organizations in Bulgaria were not only result of free choices and natural democratization 
of the institutions, but they were provoked and forced by several external and internal 
factors. 
The most important external factors of the changes were reflection of the 
permanent transformation process of the geopolitical, economical, scientific, cultural and 
social environment, and new challenges that came from the reshaped international, 
regional and local security environment. 
The most important internal factors that resulted in significant changes in the 
development process of the military institutions were the new missions and the 
modernization of the armaments with the application of the latest technologies. 
The continuation of the tension in Yugoslavia, the war in Kosovo as a direct 
strategic threat for Bulgaria and the enlargement of the EU and NATO had the most 
significant influence for the Bulgarian military reform as external factors. 
The internal factors were the emergence out of the heavy economic crisis, 
stabilization of the democratic social and economic life along with the firm policy for 
accepting the democratic values. 
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Both of the above mentioned factors imposed and fostered the alteration of rules 
and size of the armed forces, tasks, functions, structures, and needed the redefinition of 
the military expertise. 
After the Madrid Summit of NATO in 1997 it was almost clear for the politicians 
and the experts that Bulgaria is far behind in its reforms and would not be able to fulfil the 
criteria for membership, though energetic efforts had been made. 
The Washington Summit in 1999 disappointed the political leadership in this 
sense. The accession into NATO has been made the priority of the foreign policy and 
partially legitimizes the military reform. The lack of clear statement on the time frame and 
the possible trend of candidates could become a source of frustration for the population 
and jeopardize the domestic processes of stabilization.86 
Convinced in its policy the Government adopted in 1999 a package of documents, 
including the Military Doctrine87 and Plan 2004, which aimed at further restructuring of 
the Armed Forces. It aimed by planning, equipping and training to create a modem army, 
with decent information technology and logistics, with communications (linguistically and 
technically) and interoperable with western counterparts. 
The great debate between the General Staff and the political leadership was about 
the size of the Armed forces. The General Staff insisted on large number of personnel. 
86 Simon, Jeffrey, "Bulgaria and NATO: 7 Lost Years", Strategic Forum, no. 142, p. 1, 1998. 
87 Decision of the National Assembly, 8 April 1999, The State Gazette, Number 34, Sofia, 13 April 1999. 
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Some of the preliminary calculations were as shown in Table 1. 
Military Personnel in Year 2004. 
Generals and colonels 590 
Lt.colonels 1,250 
Majors 1,950 
Other officers 4,600 
General Staff 2,126 
Special Forces 593 
Strategic Communication-Information System 3,035 




Table 1. The Armed forces military personnel was estimated to be downsized to 
52,49088 J.ncluding 45,000 for the Armed Forces and the MOD and other military 
structures 
The last version of the Plan for Organizational Formation of Armed Forces until 
2004, adopted by the Government in 1999 envisaged Armed forces of 45,000 personnel 
(in accordance with p. 43 of the Military Doctrine), organized in three branches - Army, 
88 Emilova, Teodora," The Defence Minister Georgy Ananiev: No Comments on General Mihov," 
Democracy, 01 September 1999. 
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Air force and Navy. The Plan for Organizational Formation of Armed Forces until 2004 
was prepared in cooperation with civilian and military experts and with the competent 
help of advisers from UK MOD and US Pentagon. 
The priority of the Plan will be the development of the Rapid Reaction Forces. 
The Army will be their core and will have another two corps of lower level personnel and 
armament. The Air Force will have two corps with a component for the Rapid-Reaction 
Forces. The Navy will be organized in two bases, one coastal brigade and a component for 
the RRF. The work of the command-informational and logistic support will be centralized 
and optimized with two commanding posts: Strategic Communication-Information 
System and Logistic and Medical services. Special operations will be commanded by one 
central command post. 
The armament and the military equipment and machinery will be decreased in 
proportion to the number of the personnel and will be modernized. Until 2004 the aviation 
equipment will be diminished from 465 to 218, the number of the ballistic missiles SS-23 
will be diminished four times, the tanks will be reduced to 753, navy equipment - to 117, 
guns - to 2,272 and antitank devices - to 1,77289. 
The military educational system will be reorganized and from the existing "G.S. 
Rakovsky" Staff College, four Military Academies and three NCO schools, will remain 
only "G. S. Rakovsky" Staff College as a defense educational facility for training officers 
89 Angarev, Panaiot, "Ananiev and Michov on Different Oppinions for Plan 2004," Democracy, 01 
September 1999. Available (Online): [http://www.digsys.bg/bgnews/show class.html]. 15 September 1999. 
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for positions "Chief of Staff of battalion" and higher, as well as for training of civilians, 
talcing specific leadership and expert positions. 
The existing four Military Academies will be reorganized and the Artillery School 
will be closed, the Air Force, the Navy and the Army Schools will be transferred to 
faculties to the civilian Universities. The education of the officers will be also achieved in 
foreign NATO schools and academies. The establishment of the new system of military 
education and special training aims at developing a cadre capable to operate in 
multinational staffs. 
The General staff will be reduced to 3 77 people: 314 officers, 62 civilians, and 1 
NCQ90. The number of generals on active duty will be decreased from 56 to 32. The 
central bureaucracy of MOD will be reduced by 70% and will be developed in accordance 
with the requirements for the state administration. The Ministry of Defense and the 
Armed Forces will release 62,115 people: 10,617 officers, 12,530 NCO's, 18,629 soldiers 
and 20,339 civilians 91. 
This process of reduction and restructuring is very painful and connected with 
high social costs thus it has to be done with a specific caution. The reform of the Ministry 
of Defense and the subordination to it of the other structures is crucial for the effective 
90 "The General Staff Reduced with 400 People," 168 Chasa, 14 Jan. 2000. Available (Online): 
[http://www.zone168.com]. 17 January 2000. 
91 See Appendix B. The Reform 2004. 
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civilian control though as Jeffrey Simon92 recently_ said in an interview: "The civilian 
control seems to be working in Bulgaria"93. The amended legal base and the new structure 
no longer contains mechanisms by which the Chief of General Staff can exercise 
disagreement with the acts of the Minister of Defense as it happened in the past. 
The unique thing about this reform is that for the first time the military police and 
military counter-intelligence are subordinated directly to the Minister of Defense. The 
civilian control proved to be working in Bulgaria. 
The second trend of the Plan will be in the field of the military international 
cooperation and the contribution of the MOD to stabilization and prevention of conflicts 
in the region. The program "Security through Cooperation" includes international bilateral 
and regional agreements and initiatives for cooperation. The Bulgarian MOD has 
agreement with 35 states and 5 more are negotiated. 
The third part of the Plan is the strategic and political priority, based on the 
Declaration of the National Assembly of Republic of Bulgaria, corroborated by the 
National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine, the preparation of the Armed Forces 
and the accession of Bulgaria in NATO and EU. Considered as a real and powerful 
candidate the main priorities for Bulgaria are meeting the political-economic and military 
defense criteria. The efforts of the military reform are concentrated on the following key 
92 Professor J. Simon is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (U.S.A.) and 
specialist of the Bulgarian military reform. 
93 Interview of Jeffrey Simon, Capital, Number 2, 2000. Available (Online): [htpp://www.capital.bg/]. 15 
January 2000. 
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spheres: stability, democratization, professionalism and development of operative 
capacity to realize tasks in the sphere of collective defense and operations other than war. 
The existing legal basis and mechanisms will be adequately chang~d and will allow the 
implementation of a defense planning system in accordance with Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty. The "professionalization" of the officer corps will include education 
and training and development of a cadre adequate for the reform, modernization and 
integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. 
As a result of the 1999 Washington summit and in compliance with the Defense 
Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) for PfP and 
NATO cooperative operations, the Bulgarian MOD defined its priorities in reorganization, 
structural building and modernization of the Armed Forces94: 1. Development of 
interoperability potential for participation in operations under the command of NATO, 
OSCE, UN; 2. Communication-information ~nd navigation systems according to NATO 
standards; 3. Development of interoperable military infrastructure, modernization of 
military airports and naval ports, modem system for navigation and air control, 
standardized with NATO logistic; 4. Development, modernization and integration of the 
national Air-defense system with the integrated system of NATO. 
94 Minister Ananiev, "The Army has to be Ready for the Challenges to the National Security", Democracy, 
1999. Available (Online):[http://www.digsys.bg/bgnews/show class. html]. 21 September 1999. 
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The Ministry of Defense plans to remake its acquisition system and to spend more 
than $350 million during five years to build command, control and communications [C3] 
system, olready known as C3 plan95, that will be compatible with NATO. 
As professor Jeffrey Simon said "this plan is very ambitious and this is its priority. 
The lack of ambitions for reforms led to the 7 lost years for Bulgaria and NAT0"96. Now 
the concrete measures to overcome the problems and to catch up with the time guarantee 
its success. President Petar Stoyanov is engaged with it and Prime Minister Ivan Kostov 
"declared that he would personally supervise the Ministry of Defense in order to better 
implement military reform"97. The personal replacement of the Minister of Defense at the 
beginning of 2000 with the experienced diplomat Boiko Noev, former Minister of 
Defense and former Ambassador of Bulgaria to NATO, is considered a very positive step 
and necessary for the reform. 
With all these reforms Bulgaria will achieve effective Armed forces, with 
adequate defense capabilities. The Armed forces will be a confident pillar of security for 
the nation and the state organs in military conflicts, emergencies, crisis or natural disasters 
and interoperable with NATO. 
95 Clark, Colin, "Bulgaria Prepares $350 Mil Fund for NATO C3 Plan," Defense News, p. 42, 28 February 
2000. 
96 Interview of Jeffrey Simon, Capital, Number 2, 2000. Available (Online): [htpp://www.capital.bg/). 15 
January 2000. 
97 U.S.-Bulgarian Task Force, Preliminary Report, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington, D.C, February 1999. 
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In the context of the MAP, Bulgaria has already developed a substantial 
programme for the restructuring of its armed forces. Together with last 
year's Military Doctrine, this programme will create a sound basis for 
armed forces that will be fully in line with the security requirements of 
today and tomorrow. This reform is a resounding demonstration of 
Bulgaria's willingness to stay on the course it has charted for itself. NATO 
is ready to assist Bulgaria in staying on that course.98 
This analysis of the ongoing military reform in Bulgaria gives evidence of the 
achieved and expected significant changes. The changes will result not only in 
transformation of the size of the armed forces, their tasks, functions, structure, but also 
will have more deep consequence because they will change the thinking and the military 
profession. In order to have such effects the reform must be done immediately, any delay 
in time may compromise it and lead to defects. The selection of the most capable and 
educated cadre, civil and military experts, is essential for the success of such reform. At 
the same time the more immediate challenge is how to keep the highly educated and 
trained personnel in the Armed Forces, the big issue is how to motivate the cadre and to 
find incentives. The reform also needs the consensus and the support of the nation, which 
will bear its social costs and which is very much motivated by the future membership in 
NATO. The most important issue is how Bulgaria will deal with the enormous social and 
economic strains caused by its commitment to downsize the Armed Forces by more than 
half. Bulgaria aims to build adequate forces that are NATO compatible and to contribute 
to the Alliance. On the other hand if Bulgaria will not find its place among the members 
of NATO as it was estimated for the year 2002 all these efforts and changes will cause a 
98 NA TO, Speech by Secretary General at the Bulgarian National Assembly, 10 February 2000. Available 
(Online): [http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000210a.html]. 20 February 2000. 
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loss of credibility and context. In its quest Bulgaria needs the cooperation and the 
competent help of the Alliance. 
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VI. THE IMPACT OF THE KOSOVO CRISIS AND THE 
BULGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOW ARDS ACCESSION IN 
NATO 
After 1989 and the following disintegration and final dissolution of the Warsaw 
Pact in 1991, Bulgaria was no longer the front-line state, proponent of the Soviet policy in 
the region, bordering two NATO states - Greece and Turkey and militarily prepared to 
deter any possible NATO attack. Within the political vacuum of the collapsed bipolar 
model of international relations, Bulgaria had to put an end to the legacy of the 
confronting bloc system and to revise its regional "maverick role, entrenched in the 
Eastern Orthodox camp but historically at odds with both Greece and Serbia over a 
number of issues"99. Bulgaria had to change its national security concept and to 
harmonize its interests with the neighboring countries. 
Bulgaria had to overcome the narrow nationalistic goals, ethnic problems and 
internal economic and social constrains and to undertake efforts in order to preserve and 
build peace in a region, exhausted by chronic conflicts. Engaged in the process of 
constructing liberal democracy and free market economy Bulgaria needed foreign 
investments and had seriously to review and change its foreign policy. Considered by the 
world politicians along with Romania to be a symbol of totalitarianism and "the perennial 
99 Glenny, Misha, "Heading off War in the Southern Balkans", Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, Number 3, p. 102, 
1995. 
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laggards of the old Warsaw Pact"IOO, Bulgaria had to struggle to return to the international 
arena with the new image of a credible partner and to create stable relationships with the 
European community and the democratic states and institutions. There was a need to 
redefine all the principles of the foreign policymaking concept such as national interests, 
objectives, strategic threats, the perception of security environment and the ability to 
project influence and play an active role tracing its goals. Of course numerous external 
factors influenced the new choices and gave legacy to the Bulgarian foreign and security 
policy in its quest to NATO and EU. The reshaping of the European security architecture 
and the conflicts in Yugoslavia were among the international factors, which fostered the 
new active role of Bulgaria and its leading key position in South-Eastern Europe. The 
nation overcame the ethnic and religious clashes and oriented its foreign relations with its 
neighbors towards peaceful cooperation and stability. It had been the first country to 
recognize the Macedonian state and also settled its problems with Greece and Turkey. IOI 
Though the credible foreign policy record counted for little against the severe internal 
failings of the post-1989 administrationsI02 which led the state to economic crisis. With a 
Currency Board, reviving from bankruptcy in 1997 but staying decisively behind the 
democratic values Bulgaria stated a new firm course of its foreign and security policy. 
100 "Ten Years since the Wall Fell," The Economist, 6 November I999. Available (Online): 
[http://www.economist.com/editorial/justforyou/library/index _surveys.html]. 24 January 2000. 
IOI Pond, Elizabeth, "Come Together", Foreign Affairs, p. IO, vol. 79, Number 2, March/April 2000. 
102 Crampton, R. J., Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century and After, p. 437, Routledge, London, I997. 
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The short-term strategic objectives for Bulgaria were focused on stabilization of 
the process of democratization of the region and bringing about a successful settlement of 
conflicts and peace. The long-term objectives were participation in the Euro-Atlantic 
structures, strengthening of peace, democracy and market economy and promoting the 
European integration and identity. 
For that Bulgaria needed also to analyze and define its foreign policy towards 
Russia and the USA, the traditionally key factors with powerful interests in South-Eastern 
Europe and find the balance. 
The threats and constrains of the Kosovo Crisis played the role of a catalyst for the 
course of the Bulgarian foreign policy. Bulgaria showed that it had settled its nationalistic 
dilemmas and is perfectly aware of the cost of its decisions. The cooperation in the 
context of the Kosovo crisis added qualitatively new dimensions to the partnership with 
NATO and the Bulgaria's quest for membership as the Bulgarian foreign minister pointed: 
I would like to strongly emphasize that NATO's best response to present 
and future challenges to security is its enlargement to include the aspirants, 
that are in a position to give a concrete contribution to the solution of real 
problems and thus increase the defence potential of the Alliance. We are 
convinced that Bulgaria should be one of the front-runners among the next 
in vi tees. I 03 
103 Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria Mrs Nadezhda Mihailova, 
Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Brussels, 8 December 1998. 
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A. BULGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS ACCESSION IN 
NATO AND THE IMPACT OF THE KOSOVO CRISIS 
The instability and tension in South Eastern Europe since 1991, revived among the 
politicians the negative geopolitical term "the Balkanization"l04 and unleashed again 
Pandora's box of horror. The crisis in Kosovo in 1999 turned to be now the major threat 
for the security in Europe and the nearest external threat for the neighboring countries. 
Thousands of hungry and tormented people tried to find shelter and save their lives out of 
Yugoslavia thus threatening the stability of Europe. 
Bulgaria was seized in the conflict not only geographically but also because of 
deep emotional and historical links, which made it a direct participant in the events. For 
ten years Bulgaria supported the UN restrictive measures and the embargo against 
Yugoslavia and suffered enormous economic losses, with the new tension in Kosovo the 
situation was growing unbearable. The war had a negative impact on the Bulgarian 
economy, because the foreign investors were not willing to participate in an unstable 
region. The losses were estimated to over $300 million 105. Most Bulgarian exports going 
through Serbia or along the Danube now were blocked by wreckage from bridges bombed 
by NATO. Bulgaria has been almost literally caught in the crossfire. The capital, Sofia, 
which is less than 30 miles from Bulgaria's border with Serbia, was within range of 
Serbian anti-aircraft missiles. At least half-a-dozen NATO missiles that were meant to hit 
!04 Ash, Timothy Garton, "The Puzzle of Central Europe," The New York Review, p. 20, 18 March 1999. 
105 "Trade Balance Deficit Equals $717 Min for First Six Months", Capital, 9 September 1999. Available 
(Online): [http://www.capital.bg/]. 11 February 2000. 
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targets in Serbia have strayed off course into Bulgaria, one hitting a house in the capital 
Sofia suburb. 
Firmly desiring to stop the atrocities in 1998-1999 Bulgaria took the risk to oppose 
openly the events in neighboring Yugoslavia. 
Despite the tremendous economic losses, NATO's missile incidents, and 
the strengthened voice of the political opposition (the Socialist coalition), 
the Bulgarian government stayed firmly behind NATO's actions in 
Yugoslavia. I 06 
Being a reliable partner, Bulgaria fully supported the international efforts of 
NATO countries, contributing to them. Bulgaria has been surprisingly brave in that 
policy. The Government of Ivan Kostov, centre-right prime minister and the Parliament 
let NATO aircrafts fly through a large part of Bulgaria's airspace to attack targets in 
Yugoslavia from the east. NATO planners considered this strategically very important as 
it weakened Yugoslavia's air defenses, which was prepared to resist attacks from across 
the Adriatic to the west. As the crisis deepened it became obvious that association with 
NATO is no longer just a matter of harmless peacekeeping exercises and diplomatic 
rhetoric. Most '?f the countries near the conflict zone such as Albania, Macedonia, 
Romania and even Hungary and Bulgaria expressed concerns, telling the alliance that they 
cannot be expected to shoulder the risks of association with NATO unless the western 
powers were prepared to give them a formal defense guarantee. At the summit in 
106 Vencill, Maggiel, "Central Europe Finds No Other Option But to Support NATO," Weekly Defense 
Monitor, Volume 3, Issue 22, June 22, 1999. Available (Online): 
[http://www.cdi.org/weekly/1999/issue22.html]. 19 February 2000. 
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Washington in April 1999 their concerns resulted in the commitment of NATO and the 
United States to respond to any challenge to the security of the neighboring states and to 
develop a long-term comprehensive strategy for security and prosperity107. 
Bulgaria was playing a more dangerous game than other Balkan states. The war 
was just as unpopular in Bulgaria as it was in Macedonia and Greece, which both, 
however, refused to let the alliance use their airspace for combat missions or to allow 
NATO troops to move through their territory. Over 90% of Bulgarians, according to 
pollsters, were against the war. The nation was very sharply polarized and expressed its 
feeling in street demonstrations. Moreover, the number of those who wanted Bulgaria to 
join NATO went down from 60% before the war to 46%.108 On the other hand Bulgaria 
received numerous threats for direct war by Yugoslavia and as President Retar Stoyanov 
commented: "This has been a disaster for the Balkans for eight years now. Due to 
Milosevic, my country was destabilized long ago".109 
The Bulgarian policymakers had to take a tough decision. Both Mr. Kostov and 
Petar Stoyanov, Bulgaria's pro-western president, the two key political figures in defense 
and foreign affairs were worried about the growing isolation from Europe, because "the 
107 NATO, Chairman's Summary, Meeting of the NA Cat the level of Heads of State and Government with 
Countries in the Region of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, NATO Summit Press Release, 25 April 1999, 
point#S. 
108 Neshkova, Reni, "The Rationalism of the Bulgarians," Democracy, no. 119, 10 May 1999. Available 
(Online): [html.//digsys.bg/bgnews/search-rresult.html]. 19 February 2000. 
109 Drozdiak, William and Lippman, Thomas W., "NATO Summit Ends With a Restoration Vow," 
Washington Post, 26 April 1999. 
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Europeans would have to look through the fire of the war in order to see us"l 10. They also 
saw the situation as a chance to strengthen Bulgaria's bid to join NATO and the European 
Union. They were disappointed not to get a timetable for membership at the Washington 
summit in 1999. Both, however, expected to get one very soon and deliberately spared no 
effort in that direction as it was stated in the Programm of the Government: 
Our strategic goal is Bulgaria to join the European Union and NATO. The 
full membership to the European Union and NATO is a sovereign and 
explicit choice, based on a broad public consensus, and it is not an 
expression of a political situation or a result of outside pressure. 
We will be working for stronger integration in the Euro-Atlantic 
structures, which has to lead Bulgaria to a full membership to NATO. We 
will be implementing and constantly updating the National Program of the 
Republic of Bulgaria for Preparation and Membership to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. 111 
For the cooperation Bulgaria received the confident engagement of NATO and US 
political leadership that it will be given an individual approach for quick membership. 
Bulgaria was becoming a leading stabilizing factor in Southeastern Europe. It was 
one of the initiators112 of the creation ofthe_pan-Balkan peacekeeping MPFSEE Brigade 
in which participate most of the nations of the region. The Government launched a 
"southeastern European ministerial format" of the regional ministers and their Italian and 
American counterparts and also lot of other initiatives for South East European Co-
110 Ponds, Elizabeth, "Can Bulgaria Beat the Balkan Curse?," Wall Street Journal, 21April1999. 
111 Program of the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria 1997-2001. Available (Online): 
[http://www.bulgaria.govrn.bg/eng/oficial _docs/index.html]. IO February 2000. 
112 Pond, Elizabeth, "Bulgaria", Europe, pp .. 26-27, June 1999. 
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operation trying to encourage the region's states to co-operate on political and economic 
matters and to formulate common positions compatible with EU and NATO. Bulgaria 
participates also in SFOR with two platoons and in KFOR with one engineer platoon. 
Bulgaria handed over 150 Soviet-era tanks to support building the Armed forces of 
Macedonia, which Serbia's rulers still view as an upstart province rather than an 
independent state. 
The Bulgarian policy makers were convinced that the cost of rebuilding 
Southeastern Europe would be high as it was estimated to be between $30 billion and 
$100 billion. However, the costs of not participating in the rebuild would lead to further 
deterioration of the fragile democracies, and to more destabilization in the region. It was 
for these reasons that Bulgaria decisively exerted efforts. 
The conclusion has prevailed of late that Kosovo is an uncompleted 
element of the process of stabilization in the Balkans. To make the 
Stability Pact for Southeast Europe an operative one, Kosovo must find its 
public balance based on the contemporary European values - multiethnic 
co-existence, democratization, effective democratic institutions and 
respect for the human rights of everybody living in the area.113 
Bulgaria tried to be a mediator between the parties of the conflict in Kosovo. The 
Government held an informal meeting "without coat and ties"l 14 of the Prime Ministers 
of the states bordering Yugoslavia in which participated Sergio Balanzino, the deputy 
Secretary general of NATO and Javier Solana, the EU foreign policy and security 
113 Kostov, Ivan, Speech at the Parliament on February 4, 2000. Available (Online): 
[http://www.bulgaria.govrn.bg/eng/index.html]. IO February 2000. 
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commissioner, to discuss the post-war problems of South-Eastern Europe and proposed 
changes for the sanctions against Yugoslavia. The meeting was unique as it enabled the 
Prime Ministers of the states neighboring Yugoslavia to discuss their positions with those 
of the representatives of the European Union and NATO. The Prime Minister Kostov 
said: 
The countries of the region demonstrated their growing concern with the 
pace at which the Stability Pact goes. We are looking forward to the 
financing conference in March in Brussels.115 
Bulgaria, being one of the most active partners in the Stability Pact for South-
Eastern Europe was well aware that the initiative, sponsored by the European Union was 
slow in advancing to concrete commitments and the amounts of economic aid planned 
were woefully incommensurate to the needs. The need for actual and timely actions on 
behalf of the states from the region was unquestionable. The Bulgarian policy makers 
knew that if Southeastern Europe does not advance towards integration with the Euro-
Atlantic community, it risks being permanently exposed to renewed ethnic tensions and 
dangerous instabilities. 
This foreign policy is apparently an indicator that Bulgaria possesses substantial 
capacity as a strategic player in the "common foreign and strategic policy of the EU" and 
is an indivisible strategic part of the "new European strategic architecture". The visits to 
114 Karoleva, Svetla, "Javier Solana for the Fourth Time in Bulgaria", Democracy, Number 15, 18 January 
2000. Available (Online): [http://www.digsys.bg/bgnews/show_story.html]. 24 January 2000. 
11 5 Prime Minister Kostov, Ivan, Press Conference of the Participants in the Meeting of the Prime 
Ministers of the States Neighboring to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, 21-23 January 2000. 
Available (Online): [http://www.bulgaria.govm.bg/eng/index.html]. 10 February 2000. 
63 
Bulgaria of the British Prime Minister Mr. Toni Blair, Prince Charles - Successor to the 
British Throne, the German Chancellor Mr. G. Schroder, of the President of the US Mr. 
Clinton and many other prominent politicians and EU and NATO officials, who stated 
their support for the Bulgarian position, stand to adequately demonstrate the efficiency of 
the Bulgarian statecraft. Bulgaria proved that it could play a substantial role as a NATO 
member and can strengthen the regional flank. Equilibrium has yet to be found in the 
Balkans and there may well be more violence to come. The lessons from Kosovo are still 
to be learned, but the message it sent horrifies the diplomats. A spillover of a new ethnic 
conflict might drag in all neighboring states - Serbia, Albania, Macedonia, Greece, Turkey 
and shift to the Aegean Sea. Such clash will weaken NATO's southern tier and definitely 
involve Russia and US. The policymakers must play the game skillfully to prevent more 
violence. Rather than on redrawing maps, all efforts should be concentrated on curing two 
crucial Balkan failings: a deficiency of democracy, and disastrous economic policies. The 
US and the leading EU countries are already aware that Europe should possess a capacity 
for collective military action that is separable from the ordinary structures of NATO, and 
thus not always dependent on the military leadership of the United States. The concept of 
the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) is seen as part of the deepening of 
NATO. In that respect, it can serve as a complement to the broadening of the Alliance. 
As incentives for the efforts and the good achievements, NATO and the EU have 
to intensify their support and to incorporate Bulgaria and other region's fragile states as 
full members at a faster pace. The wide gap between Central Europe's fast-track aspirants 
for integration with the West and the slow-moving states from the South and the East 
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must be narrowed. Bulgaria, which was formally invited to start membership negotiations 
in EU on the 14 December 1999 Helsinki EU Summit has its important place in the 
European policy and security architecture and has to become a full NATO member as 
soon as possible in order to accomplish the framework of the European identity. 
The Secretary General of NATO Lord Robertson during his visit m Sofia 
evaluated the Bulgarian relations and contribution to NATO as: 
Bulgaria's actions during the Kosovo cns1s seriously enhanced your 
European credentials. NATO prevailed because it could count on the 
active and unflinching support by its Partner countries, Bulgaria among the 
foremost. 
I salute Bulgaria for its support -- and for its courage. Yours support was 
more than help in an emergency. It was a resounding vindication of a 
concept of Europe as a zone of shared values -- a sign that Europe is truly 
becoming a common security space. 
Bulgaria's strong stance in the Kosovo crisis did not go unnoticed. If 
anything, it has given further proof of your country's determination to 
achieve its full integration into Europe. Today, Bulgaria's European 
vocation is beyond doubt.116 
Bulgaria is definitely a part of Europe and its foreign policy aims prove that the 
southeastern region is not an accursed part of the continent. 
The Bulgarian quest towards NATO and EU is influenced and interacts with the 
foreign policy and interests of the two other main players - the US and Russia. These 
relations are considered of great and defining importance and will be analyzed in the next 
sections. 
11 6 Speech by Lord Robertson, the Secretary General ofNATO at the Bulgarian National Assembly, 10 
February 2000. Available (Online): [http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000210a.html]. 20 February 
2000. 
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B. FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH THE US AND RUSSIA 
For more than 45 years after the partition of the world between the Great Powers 
at the end of World War II the Bulgarian foreign and security policy were acting definitely 
under the auspices of the Soviet Union 117 and as integral part of the Soviet strategic 
interests. With the end of the Soviet Empire Russia was not anymore in a position to 
dictate and dominate the decisions of the Bulgarian policymakers. Taken out of the 
context of common ideology the relations between the two states deteriorated and until 
now remained vague. Russia was engaged with its internal problems and spent minimum 
efforts to keep Bulgaria as ally. Russia tried to project political influence based upon 
economic tools but its shrunk and unstable market, drowned by inflation and ruled by 
Mafia structures was not able to keep the old positions. Though heavily dependent on oil 
supplies from Russia Bulgaria was firm on pro-western political orientation and definitely 
shared the democratic values of Western Europe. The Russian supplier of oil and gasoline 
"Gazprom" raised several times the prices. At the end of January 1998, at the height of the 
conflict between Bulgaria and Russia about the gas, the chief of the company Rem 
Vyakhirev, said: "Ifwe stop gas deliveries, the Bulgarian government will be swept away 
by the freezing people." 118 
117 Crampton, R., Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century - and After, p .. 240-254, Routledge, New 
York, NY, 1997. 
118 Fileva, Lilia, "Will there be a" Political" Agreement with Gazprom", Capital, 6 December 1999. 
Available (Online):[http://www.capital.bg/]. 15 February 2000. 
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Bulgaria was forced to seek another source. This oil dispute although solved in 
1998 was among the numerous other turning points for the Bulgarian policy. 
The political conflict between the two states was especially sharp on the issue of 
Kosovo when Bulgaria refused to allow Russian military airplanes to fly through its 
airspace and over its territory thus opposing the Russian scenario for partitioning the 
Balkans into new spheres of influence. 
While receiving a rapturous welcome on November 22, 1999 for the first visit of 
the President of the US to Bulgaria Mr. Clinton acclaimed the Bulgarian policy and: 
the pivotal role the government played largely behind the scenes in 
securing NATO's primacy, and Russia's virtual exclusion, in the struggle 
for influence over post-war Kosovo.119 
The equation Europe, the US and Russia needs to be well balanced in the foreign 
interests of Bulgaria. 
The new Russian National Security Concept and Military Doctrine adopted by the 
government of Vladimir Putin at the very beginning of year 2000 included the use of 
nuclear weapons in case of any attack with conventional weapons, if all other measures 
are exhausted. The new Doctrine defines the enlargement of NATO as a threat for Russia 
and states the strategic Russian interests concerning the Balkans and the Baltic regions. 
The concept sees greater military threats to Russia, particularly from the 
expanding NATO alliance; and views a weakening of the United Nations 
119 "Clinton Props up the Old World", The Economist, November 1999. Available (Online): 
[http: //www.economist.com/ editoriaVj ustforyou/library /index_ surveys.html]. 25 December 1999. 
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and lack of integration of former Soviet states to be threats to Russia's 
security.120 
The concept vividly reflects Russia's more antagonistic view of the world and 
recognizes that its conventional forces are in disorder and the nuclear deterrence is most 
likely possible option. 
Such position along with the expressed Russian opposition for Bulgarian 
membership in NATQ121 is another convincing factor for the foreign policy of Bulgaria, 
which seeks to find in its alliances the balance not the so-called "bandwagoning11 122 and 
to build security not confrontation. Though recently Bulgaria has more deep relations with 
the US it has to make clear its relations with Russia and find the proper way to improve 
and warm them thus it could play more efficiently its role of regional stabilizing factor. 
For the US and its policymakers, which has to reconsider its role as the only 
superpower after the Cold War Bulgaria gained more strategic importance with the 
unfolding of the conflict in the Balkans. Security of the region became an important 
consideration for the American interests and_ especially with NATO engagement in 
Kosovo. For the US was clear the importance of the geostrategic position of Bulgaria and 
its quick and stabile pace of democratic development. 
120 American Foreign Policy Council, Russia Reform Monitor No. 737, Washington, D.C., 14 January 
2000. Available (Online): [http://www.afpc.org/rrm/rrm737.htm]. IO February 2000. 
121 Domuschieva, Rada, "Russia: NATO in Bulgaria? NO!", 168 Chasa, 03 December 1999. Available 
(Online):[http://www.zonel68.com/] 15 December 1999. 
122 Bandwagoning for the alliance-formation theory refers to alignment with the source of danger. See 
Walt, Stephen M., The Organizations of Alliances, Corne! University Press, Ithaca and London, 1995. 
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The possible building of the pipeline for transfer of Caspian oil through Bulgaria's 
territory increases additionally its strategic importance for the Western partners, especially 
forthe US. 
On February 10, 1998 President Clinton, in a meeting with President of Bulgaria -
Petar Stoyanov, announced a new Action Plan for Southeast Europe123. The Action Plan 
envisaged further dynamism to U.S. cooperation with the stable democracies of Southeast 
Europe. It aimed at helping states in the region to consolidate reforms, develop regional 
cooperation, and advance their integration into the European and transatlantic 
communities. The U.S. Action Plan for Southeast Europe was to be implemented along 
three tracks: 1) expanding US bilateral political, economic, military and civil cooperation 
between US and the states of Southeastern Europe, 2) promoting greater regional 
cooperation and 3) the efforts of the United States, bilaterally and multilaterally, 
particularly through closer cooperation with members of the European Union, to embed 
the countries of the region into the evolving architecture of European and transatlantic 
institutions. The Action Plan was an evolving framework for the achievement of U.S. 
goals in the region. 
The Plan included intellectual, technical and financial support for the Bulgarian 
military reform, concrete projects and further enhancement of the cooperation in security 
matters. 
123 Action Plan for Southeastern Europe, announced by the White House on the occasion of Bulgarian 
President Stoyanov's visit to the United States, p. 4, 10 February 1998. 
69 
In order to implement the Plan the Bilateral Working Groups on Defense Matters 
explored opportunities for further cooperation and the particular result were the Bulgarian 
Defense Ministry's program 2004 and the report of the US general Kivenaar, which served 
as a basis of the plan for Bulgaria's accession to NAT0124. The enlargement of the scope 
for Bulgaria of the International Military Educational Training program was yet another 
aspect of the plan. 
The noticeable positive change in the US foreign policy and diplomacy towards 
Bulgaria, especially after the Kosovo crisis, and the firm engagement and interests of the 
US with Bulgaria were once again demonstrated during the visit of President Clinton to 
Bulgaria on the 22 of November 1999 as the first US President to visit Bulgaria 125. The 
political aim of the visit was to reveal that the security in Southeastern Europe remains a 
major priority for Washington despite the obligations of the European Union and that 
Bulgaria plays important role in this priority. President Clinton did not set a date for 
Bulgaria's accession in NATO but he hinted at the fact that the possibility for this to 
happen is closer than ever. Obviously the officials in the White House have realized the 
fact that the criteria which the future NATO member countries must meet should 
encompass something more than simply covering standards. Bulgaria's position did not go 
without notice in view of the fact that during the war in Kosovo the NATO members, 
124 Assenova, Margarita, "US Assists Bulgaria in Military Reform", Capital, 8 February 1999, Available 
(Online): [htpp://www.capital.bg/1998-06/9-6-3.htrnl]. 20 February 2000. 
125 "Clinton Props up the Old World", The Economist, Available (Online): 
[http://www.economist.comleditorial/justforyou/library/index _ surveys.htrnl]. 25 December 1999. 
70 
,--------------------------------------------------
Greece, the Czech Republic and Hungary took a stance different from the expected one as 
to their military obligations not giving access to their territory for the NATO troops. 
The long-term involvement of the foreign policy of the US with Bulgaria is yet to 
be revealed. To a great extend it will depend on the internal interests of the both states and 
the future results of the Bulgarian democratic reforms. Bulgaria needs the support of the 
US to strengthen the democratic statecraft and the free market. In this context it has to be 
considered that NATO is the main vehicle legitimizing the American presence in 
Europe126, though the only organization with the means, mainly American, to act in 
crisis. Europe also is the major economic partner of the US and the peace and stability in 
the continent is of vital importance for both 127. For that the US needs the support of every 
state there, especially the support of reliable partners as Bulgaria. 
126 Kaplan, La"Wrence, NATO and the United States, p. 184, Twayne Publishers, New York, 1994. 
127 Serfaty, Simon, Stay the Course, European Unity and Atlantic Solidarity, p. 85, Praeger Publishers, 




The historic opportunity at the dawn of the 21st century for Bulgaria is to change 
the paradigm and to participate in the creation of unified Euro-Atlantic zone of security 
and stability without dividing lines and permanent gray zones in the heart of Europe. The 
European identity is built, based on the premise that shared interests and challenges 
obligates common settlements with collective and cooperative deeds on behalf of every 
democratic statel28. 
Analyzing the Bulgarian quest to the Euro-Atlantic membership one can see that it 
addresses the grand question that goes beyond Bulgaria. This is the issue of the future of 
"Europe" and the credibility of its institutions versus the inherited values of the nation-
states and the different cultures. The evidence that the EU, NATO and the European Ideal 
are productively evolving stands for all to see though both NATO and the European 
Union need to work harder about the present pace, direction, and scale of their further 
enlargements. 
The Kosovo crisis of 1998-99 revealed many defects in European institutions, but 
the member states seem willing to correct them. The process of the enlargement of EU 
and NATO now intensifies and new members want to venture into that "elite project". 
Europe is preparing the day when it will become a nation in itself and there must not be 
128 Moravcsik, Andrew, editor, Centralization or Fragmentation? Europe Facing the Challenges of 
Deepening, Diversity and Democracy, p. 182, Brooking Institution press, New York, NY, 1998. 
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states-outsiders. NATO as the European collective defense and security core is the 
vanguard tool for promoting this idea and a guarantor for its future. 
The government of Bulgaria responded positively to the NATO appeal for 
cooperation during the conflict in Kosovo and suffered substantial economic losses as a 
result, now it has high expectations. Bulgaria strongly seeks to join NATO and is on its 
way to negotiate the membership to the European Union. The early entry of Bulgaria into 
the EU is already ensured and serves as a potent example for other southeast European 
states.129 The positive results of the dedicated efforts of Bulgaria to gain its long-term 
aspiration for full membership in NATO, which are another potent example for the other 
aspirants, should be and are also positively recognized by the NATO states. But still there 
is not firm message for the time frame of the entrance though Bulgaria considers the early 
entrance vital. 
The ongoing democratic reforms in Bulgaria like most of the states from 
Southeastern Europe - Romania, Macedonia, Albania and Slovakia are fragile. Retrograde 
forces might replace the trend of the reforms, if the expectations for economic assistance 
and security assurance, which the West raised, are quashed. In this sense the inattention of 
the European institutions is unacceptable. Moreover the time is perfect to 
"demythologize" the essence of the "Balkan hatred". 
The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and the NATO initiatives should start 
effectively to give results. 
129 Leonard, Dick, "Bulgaria Aims for EU", Europe, Number 392, p. 4, December/January 1999-2000. 
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However, good intentions and good results in the Balkans are not enough. 
NATO must be engaged in the changing world around it or risk 
irrelevance. Meeting today's challenges and preparing for tomorrow's is the 
fundamental business of the Alliance. This, in turn, will require 
contributions and commitment from all of us.130 
Bulgaria has already demonstrated its firm desire and commitment to support 
NATO as a reliable partner and advanced in the processes of reforming its security and 
military institutions. The main goal of the reform is to achieve interoperable and capable 
forces, ready to fulfill their constitutional obligations and to contribute to NATO. The 
reform again might be compromised if there is no positive respond from the Alliance. 
On the other hand the enlargement of NATO guarantees its survival as 
organization because thus NA TO will have function for the immediate future to assure 
peace and order in Europe including with the guarantees under Article 5.131 
Probably no one has a monopoly of creativity as to how Europe might develop 
because it is a matter of political consensus between the nation-states. No matter what 
were the initial egoistic intentions of the founders of the European Union and NATO, the 
European identity is making its way and its acceptance is our choice or destiny. Europe 
with its policy, security and future, is the area where Bulgaria will remain for a long time 
and has its definite place in the joint construction project of the European identity. 
130 Ambassador Vershbow, Alexander, U.S. permanent representative on the North Atlantic Council, 
"Preserving the Transatlantic Link," an address at Wilton Park, England. January 20, 2000. Available 
(Online): [http://www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/eap/00012403.htm]. 20 February 2000. 
131 Kaplan, Lawrence, The long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years, p. 237, Praeger Publishers, 
Westport, CT, 1999. 
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